Review of California Wildfire Evacuations from 2017 to 2019 by Wong, Stephen D. et al.
UC Office of the President
ITS reports
Title
Review of California Wildfire Evacuations from 2017 to 2019
Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5w85z07g
Authors
Wong, Stephen D.
Broader, Jacquelyn C.
Shaheen, Susan A., PhD
Publication Date
2020-03-01
DOI
10.7922/G29G5K2R
eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library
University of California
DOI: 10.7922/G2WW7FVK 
 
  
STEPHEN WONG, JACQUELYN BROADER, 
AND SUSAN SHAHEEN, PH.D.  
MARCH 2020 
REVIEW OF CALIFORNIA 
WILDFIRE EVACUATIONS 
FROM 2017 TO 2019 
 
DOI: 10.7922/G29G5K2R 
Wong, Broader, Shaheen  2 
 
DOI: 10.7922/G29G5K2R 
 
Technical Report Documentation Page 
1. Report No. 
UC-ITS-2019-19-b 
2. Government Accession No. 
N/A 
3. Recipient’s Catalog No. 
N/A 
4. Title and Subtitle 
Review of California Wildfire Evacuations from 2017 to 2019 
5. Report Date 
March 2020 
6. Performing Organization Code  
ITS-Berkeley 
7. Author(s) 
Stephen D. Wong (https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3638-3651), 
Jacquelyn C. Broader (https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3269-955X), 
Susan A. Shaheen, Ph.D. (https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3350-856X) 
8. Performing Organization Report 
No.  
N/A 
9. Performing Organization Name and Address 
Institute of Transportation Studies, Berkeley 
109 McLaughlin Hall, MC1720 
Berkeley, CA 94720-1720 
10. Work Unit No. 
N/A 
11. Contract or Grant No. 
UC-ITS-2019-19 
12. Sponsoring Agency Name and Address 
The University of California Institute of Transportation Studies 
www.ucits.org 
13. Type of Report and Period 
Covered 
Final Report 
14. Sponsoring Agency Code 
UC ITS 
15. Supplementary Notes 
DOI: 10.7922/G29G5K2R 
16. Abstract 
Between 2017 and 2019, California experienced a series of devastating wildfires that together led over one million people to be 
ordered to evacuate. Due to the speed of many of these wildfires, residents across California found themselves in challenging 
evacuation situations, often at night and with little time to escape. These evacuations placed considerable stress on public resources 
and infrastructure for both transportation and sheltering. In the face of these clear challenges, transportation and emergency 
management agencies across California have widely varying levels of preparedness for major disasters, and nearly all agencies do not 
have the public resources to adequately and swiftly evacuate all populations in danger. To holistically address these challenges and 
bolster current disaster and evacuation planning, preparedness, and response in California, we summarize the evacuations of eleven 
major wildfires in California between 2017 and 2019 and offer a cross-comparison to highlight key similarities and differences. We 
present results of new empirical data we collected via an online survey of individuals impacted by: 1) the 2017 October Northern 
California Wildfires (n=79), 2) the 2017 December Southern California Wildfires (n=226), and 3) the 2018 Carr Wildfire (n=284). These 
data reveal the decision-making of individuals in these wildfires including choices related to evacuating or staying, departure timing, 
route, sheltering, destination, transportation mode, and reentry timing. We also present results related to communication and 
messaging, non-evacuee behavior, and opinion of government response. Using the summarized case studies and empirical evidence, 
we present a series of recommendations for agencies to prepare for, respond to, and recover from wildfires. 
17. Key Words 
Evacuation, wildfires, disasters preparedness, emergency 
management, behavior, warning systems, case studies, policy 
18. Distribution Statement 
No restrictions  
19. Security Classif. (of this report) 
Unclassified 
20. Security Classif. (of this page) 
Unclassified 
21. No. of Pages 
76 
22. Price 
N/A 
Form DOT F 1700.7 (8-72) 
 
Reproduction of completed page authorized 
Wong, Broader, Shaheen  3 
 
DOI: 10.7922/G29G5K2R 
 
Executive Summary 
Recent wildfires in California have exposed critical challenges in evacuating populations to safety. From 
2017 to 2019, 11 large-scale wildfires in California each required the evacuation of 10,000 or more people 
(Table ES1). In most cases, local agencies and resources were overwhelmed by the speed and scale of the 
fires. In this report, we document these wildfires through case study analysis, focusing on the evacuation 
process. We supplement this work by presenting descriptive statistics of individuals impacted by the 2017 
October Northern California Wildfires (n=79), the 2017 December Southern California Wildfires (n=226), 
and the 2018 Carr Wildfire (n=284). 
First, we present case studies summarizing the evacuations during 11 wildfires between 2017 and 2019 in 
California. We found that for 11 major wildfires with the largest evacuations over the three-year span: 
 Approximately 1.1 million people combined were ordered to evacuate; 
• 100,000 or more people were ordered to evacuate from five wildfires; 
• Between 10,000 and 99,999 people were ordered to evacuate from six wildfires; 
 Approximately 1.48 million acres combined were burned; and 
 Over 30,000 structures were destroyed. 
Table ES1: Major California Wildfires from 2017 to 2019  
Wildfire Location Dates Acres Burned 
Structures 
Destroyed 
Approximate 
Evacuees* 
Northern California 
Wildfires 
Napa, Sonoma, Solano 
Counties 
October 8, 2017 – 
October 31, 2017 144,987+ 7,101+ 100,000 
Southern California 
Wildfires 
Ventura, Santa 
Barbara, Los Angeles 
Counties 
December 4, 2017 - 
December 15, 2017 303,983+ 1,112+ 286,000 
Carr Fire Shasta and Trinity Counties 
July 23, 2018 – 
August 30, 2018 229,651 1,614 39,000 
Mendocino 
Complex Fire 
Mendocino, Lake, 
Glenn, and Colusa 
Counties 
July 27, 2018 – 
September 19, 2018 459,123 280 17,000 
Camp Fire Butte County November 8, 2018 – November 25, 2018 153,336 18,804 52,000 
Woolsey Fire Ventura and Los Angeles Counties 
November 8, 2018 – 
November 21, 2018 96,949 1,643 250,000 
Hill Fire Ventura County November 8, 2018 – November 16, 2018 4,531 4 17,000 
Saddle Ridge Fire Los Angeles County  October 10, 2019 – October 31, 2019 8,799 19 100,000 
Kincade Fire Sonoma County  October 23, 2019 – November 6, 2019 77,758 374 200,000 
Tick Fire Los Angeles County October 24, 2019 – October 31, 2019 4,615 22 50,000 
Getty Fire Los Angeles County  October 28, 2019 – November 5, 2019  745 10 25,000 
* Refers to the number of people who were ordered to evacuate  
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Analysis of the 11 wildfires revealed key similarities including:  
 Human involvement in the ignition and/or inadvertent spread of fires;  
 High vegetation and fuel levels and high winds that exacerbated the spread of fires; 
 Rapid fire spread along the wildland-urban interface (WUI); 
 Challenges in communicating evacuation orders to residents; 
 Significant evacuations via personal vehicles leading to congestion; 
 Assistance (or potential assistance) from transit agencies in evacuating residents; 
 Roadway and debris impediments to evacuating; 
 Assistance by the American Red Cross and local organizations for sheltering and reentry;  
 Rapid filling of public evacuation shelters; and 
 Resource offers by a variety of organizations, but lack of formalized reentry plans. 
The case studies also revealed characteristics of each wildfire that led to differences in communication, 
transportation, and sheltering response. These differences indicate that a toolkit of transportation 
strategies needs to be flexible.  
Communication 
 Agencies chose not to use the Wireless Emergency Alert (WEA) system due to concerns that the 
WEA would reach larger than necessary geographic areas (2017 Northern California Wildfires); 
 Poor mobile phone service in a mostly rural area posed challenges in reaching evacuees (2018 
Mendocino Complex Fire); 
 Destruction of telephone lines and loss of power decreased communication capacity and hindered 
communication measures (2018 Camp Fire); and 
 Lack of power due to a Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) public safety power shutoff (PSPS) event 
made communication (via mobile phones and landlines) very difficult (2019 Kincade Fire). 
Evacuation  
 Debris blocked a road that serves as a single exit for a community, and residents had to be 
helicoptered to safety (2017 Northern California Wildfires); 
 People with select medical needs (e.g., premature babies) were evacuated early to specialized 
facilities (2018 Carr Fire); 
 Fire moved so quickly that many people had to evacuate on foot (2018 Camp Fire); 
 Los Angeles implemented local programs (e.g., Red Flag Parking Program) to increase road 
capacity (2018 Woolsey Fire; 2019 Getty Fire); and 
 Officials implemented contraflow on the Pacific Coast Highway to increase capacity and ease 
congestion (2018 Woolsey Fire). 
Sheltering 
 Large livestock in the area required shelter and were cared for by animal non-profits and local 
shelters (2018 Mendocino Complex Fire; 2018 Carr Fire); 
 Shelters were threatened by poor weather conditions and spread of illnesses (2018 Camp Fire); 
and 
 A local university implemented a shelter-in-place plan rather than evacuate (2018 Woolsey Fire). 
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Second, we present descriptive statistics of both evacuees and non-evacuees from three major California 
wildfires in 2017 and 2018: 1) the 2017 October Northern California Wildfires (n=79), 2) the 2017 
December Southern California Wildfires (n=226), and 3) the 2018 Carr Wildfire (n=284).  These statistics 
begin to build a clearer picture of individual behavior (e.g., evacuate or stay), communication (e.g., type 
and source of evacuation orders received), use of logistical resources (e.g., transportation mode and 
shelter resources), evacuation characteristics (e.g., destination and route), and return to impacted areas 
(e.g., reentry) for wildfires. Results are presented below as a range that incorporates all three wildfires. 
Further details on the corresponding results for each wildfire can be found in the main report. Key results 
include: 
 A non-compliance rate (i.e., individuals who received a mandatory evacuation order but did not 
evacuate) ranging between 3% and 13%;  
 A shadow evacuation rate (i.e., individuals who did not receive a mandatory evacuation order but 
evacuated) ranging between 29% and 75%; 
 A within county evacuation rate ranging between 66% and 70%; 
 Spikes in evacuation departure days ranging between 33% and 78% of evacuees leaving on a single 
day, depending on the wildfire; 
 Variable evacuation departure times with 51% to 73% departing at night between 6:00 p.m. and 
5:59 a.m., depending on the wildfire; 
 Preference to shelter with family or a friend (49% to 70%) and at a hotel or motel (13% to 23%); 
 Initial sheltering through a peer-to-peer service, such as Airbnb (0.4% to 3%) and low use of public 
shelters (2% to 5%);  
 Predominate use of one vehicle (34% to 45%) and two or more vehicles (49% to 62%) to evacuate; 
 Variable use of routes as the primary road type of travel but generally higher use of highways 
(32% to 62%), no majority type (17% to 35%), and major roads (15% to 27%); 
 A low GPS-navigation usage rate ranging between 8% and 19% for routing; and 
 A wide spread of reentry days (with 3% to 32% returning two weeks or more after the initial 
wildfire outbreak) and only 22% to 33% of respondents stating they received information to 
return from an official source. 
Results also indicate that agencies were only moderately successful in issuing evacuation orders, 
communicating to the public, and managing transportation. Specific communication and opinion of 
government response results include:  
 A moderately high rate of respondents (59% to 79%) who received a mandatory evacuation order 
and who found the message to be extremely clear; 
 A moderately low rate of respondents (37% to 45%) who received a voluntary evacuation order 
and who found the message to be extremely clear; 
 A wide distribution of communication methods for mandatory orders, with four different 
platforms (two wildfires) and seven different platforms (one wildfire) each reaching 25% or more 
of respondents; 
 Highly variable avenues of receiving information for mandatory evacuation orders that 
significantly differed by wildfire such as reverse 911 calls (8% to 39%); text messages (29% to 
50%); social media (15% to 34%); alerts from a subscribed service (12% to 42%); and internet 
websites (8% to 38%); 
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 Receipt of mandatory evacuation orders directly through personal interactions with public 
officials (30% to 42%) and secondary sources such as friends, neighbors, and extended family (27% 
to 38%); 
 A low rate of receiving mandatory evacuation orders through television announcements (13% to 
21%); 
 A high rate of seeking additional information, ranging from 30% to 50% and 62% to 67% of 
respondents for mandatory and voluntary evacuation orders respectively; 
 Moderately low overall opinion of an extremely effective or very effective government 
management of roads (29% to 42%), shelters (37% to 40%), and overall evacuation (39% to 49%); 
and 
 Low overall opinion of an extremely effective or very effective government management of 
communication (23% to 35%) and evacuation of carless populations (10% to 13%). 
Non-evacuees were also asked why they decided not to evacuate. Key reasons given for not evacuating 
include: 
 Not receiving any evacuation orders (30% to 71%) 
 Not wanting to leave (27% to 39%) 
 Wanting to protect property (17% to 37%) 
 Having some work requirements during the fire (0% to 24%) 
 Not wanting to go to a public shelter (0% to 16%) 
 Being unsure where they could take a pet (7% to 10%) 
 Not wanting to sit in traffic (5% to 8%) 
 Not having the money to evacuate (3% to 6%) 
The report concludes with a series of recommendations based on the case studies and the results from 
the wildfire evacuation surveys. Several key recommendations are included in Table ES2. Overall, agencies 
need a unique toolkit of strategies to effectively evacuate residents from wildfires. This research is a first 
step in assisting governments to prepare for, respond to, and recover from wildfires.  
Table ES2: Key Recommendations  
Topic Area Recommendation 
Evacuation Orders and 
Communication 
Agencies should leverage mandatory evacuation orders, improve 
evacuation order communication, and rapidly distribute orders to increase 
compliance. Evacuation orders should contain additional information (e.g., 
available shelters, current road closures, safety tips, reminders to help 
others) to improve the evacuation. 
Evacuation Orders and 
Communication 
Evacuation orders, especially when both voluntary and mandatory orders 
are issued, need to have clear geographical boundaries and departure 
times to reduce shadow evacuations. Orders also need to be distributed 
rapidly. 
Evacuation Orders and 
Communication 
All communication with the public should be quickly distributed and 
consistent across platforms and in a variety of languages. Agencies should 
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maintain a high media presence and control rumors to improve 
communication flow. Agencies should also consider alternative low-tech 
communication methods including door-to-door notifications, radios, 
static sirens, and mobile sirens (via emergency vehicles or drones) to 
prepare for power outages.   
Evacuation Orders and 
Communication 
To decrease defending behavior, agencies should develop information and 
education campaigns about the risks of defending and the impacts it has 
on firefighting ability. Agencies could consider workshops, public forums, 
and school-based programs to encourage safe behavior for wildfires for a 
variety of communities. 
Departure Timing 
Agencies need to be prepared for evacuations that occur at any time of 
day, including more chaotic nighttime evacuations. Given the high 
variability of when wildfires occur, agencies need to be able to ramp up 
resources, staff, and communication very quickly at any time of day. 
Transportation Mode 
Transportation response and evacuation models need to account for 
multi-vehicle households when designing capacity-increasing measures. 
Agencies should also consider leveraging potential spare capacity in extra 
vehicles to help carless households. 
Destination and Route 
Agencies, including state agencies, should deploy congestion reduction 
measures closer to the impact area of the fire, in high-risk neighborhoods, 
and along major arterial roads. In cases where highways are close to the 
impact area, resources should also be deployed to increase highway 
capacity.  
Sheltering 
Agencies should increase accommodation capacity by working with the 
American Red Cross, other non-governmental organizations, community-
based organizations (e.g., churches), private companies (e.g., Airbnb), and 
private citizens. 
Sheltering 
Agencies should ensure that public shelters have resources (e.g., 
Americans with Disabilities Act [ADA] accessible facilities, medical supplies, 
trained staff) for access and functional needs (AFN) populations and space 
for pets. Shelters should be pre-designated if pets are allowed. 
Reentry 
Reentry plans need a communication element to transmit procedures for 
returning to evacuees. Similar to evacuation orders, reentry information 
should be communicated consistently across multiple platforms. 
Work Requirements 
Agencies should work with employers to reduce work requirements for 
evacuees and increase flexible schedules (e.g., telecommuting) during 
emergency events to increase evacuation rates. 
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Introduction 
Between 2017 and 2019, California experienced a series of devastating wildfires that together forced the 
evacuation of over one million people (Table ES1). Due to the speed of many of these wildfires, residents 
across California found themselves in dangerous situations, often at night and with little time to evacuate. 
These evacuations placed considerable stress on public resources and infrastructure for both 
transportation and sheltering. At the same time, transportation and emergency management agencies 
across the state have widely varying levels of preparedness for major disasters, and nearly all agencies do 
not have the public resources to adequately and swiftly evacuate all populations in danger. Agencies in 
California and across the United States are also ill-equipped to evacuate vulnerable populations who do 
not have the ability or means to evacuate. To holistically address these challenges and bolster current 
disaster and evacuation planning, preparedness, and response in California, we collected information on 
the evacuations of 11 major California wildfires from 2017 to 2019 and empirical data for individuals who 
were impacted by three of these major wildfires.  
A significant amount of case study research and analysis of wildfires has used qualitative methods with 
the direct purposes of building preparedness (McGee and Russell, 2003), improving communication 
(Taylor et al., 2005; Cohn et al., 2006; Stidham et al., 2011), understanding social dynamics within the 
wildfire context (Goodman and Proudley, 2008; Cote and McGee, 2014; McCaffrey et al., 2015), and 
considering alternative strategies to evacuations (Paveglio et al., 2010). These studies, which employ 
qualitative data from the United States, Canada, or Australia, offer key conclusions (Table 1) that could be 
used by agencies in developing improved transportation, communication, and sheltering in wildfires. 
Concurrently, multiple studies have focused on framework development and policies for wildfire 
evacuations, including lessons learned from previous wildfires (Table 2). Early examples of descriptive 
statistics for fires include Fischer III et al. (1995) for the Ephrata Fire in Pennsylvania and Benight et al. 
(2004) for the 2002 Colorado Wildfires. More recently, research across various geographies has focused 
on developing discrete choice models using data from evacuees and non-evacuees to assess the factors 
that influence behavior (Strahan, 2017; Toledo et al., 2018; McCaffrey et al., 2018; Lovreglio et al., 2019; 
Wong et al., 2020a). A brief review of these discrete choice studies, along with research that used 
hypothetical wildfire data, is presented in Wong et al. (2020a), while a full review of wildfire evacuation 
behavior studies can be found in McLennan et al. (2018). 
Additional research in wildfire evacuations has extended to simulation and traffic modeling (Cova and 
Johnson, 2002; Wolshon and Marchive III, 2007; Chen and Zhan, 2008; Beloglazov et al., 2016; Ronchi et 
al., 2017; Intini et al., 2019; Gwynne et al., 2019; Ronchi et al., 2019), transportation response strategies 
(Cova and Johnson, 2003; Shahabi and Wilson, 2018) including trigger models for evacuations (Dennison 
et al., 2007; Larsen et al., 2011; Li et al., 2015; Li et al., 2019), and framing of decision-making (Nguyen et 
al., 2018; Folk et al., 2019; Lovreglio et al., 2019). 
Despite these studies in wildfire evacuations, two key gaps exist. First, case studies and reviews of 
evacuation processes focused on wildfire evacuations remain largely missing in the literature, and national 
reports (which are usually available for major hurricanes) are not widely available for wildfires. Moreover, 
research has focused on a single wildfire at a time, missing potential connections and conclusions derived 
from multiple wildfires. We address this first key gap by summarizing 11 major wildfire evacuations in 
California and offering a cross-comparison of key similarities and differences among fires. Second, non-
evacuee and evacuee actions in California wildfires, particularly related to evacuation behavior, receipt of 
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information, and logistical decisions are not fully known. The case studies only provide a timeline of events 
and an analysis of evacuation processes, not the decisions of individuals impacted by the California 
wildfires. We address this second gap by presenting descriptive statistics results of three surveys 
distributed to individuals impacted by three major California wildfires. These results offer preliminary 
understanding of evacuee choice-making and can be used to inform evacuation modeling and simulations. 
For the remainder of this work, we first present in-depth case study descriptions of the primary wildfires 
that impacted California from 2017 to 2019. For these case studies, we focus our attention on the 
evacuation process, communication, and wildfire timeline. To supplement these case studies, we 
distributed an online survey to individuals impacted by the 2017 October Northern California Wildfires 
(n=79), the 2017 December Southern California Wildfires (n=226), and the 2018 Carr Wildfire (n=284). 
Using these data, we present key descriptive statistics for evacuation decision-making, communication 
and messaging, and government response. From the case studies and descriptive statistics, we provide 
practice-ready recommendations for agencies to improve their evacuation response.  
Table 1: Key Qualitative Studies on Wildfire Evacuations 
Authors 
(Year) Topic 
Key 
Location(s) Key Conclusions 
McGee and 
Russell (2003) 
Preparedness Rural Australia 
(North Central 
Victoria) 
Long-time residents were generally more prepared due to 
social networks, previous experience, and involvement in 
local fire brigades. 
Agency involvement and directives encouraged community 
preparedness, which led to year-round preparation, 
especially for those who wanted to stay and defend. 
Demographics within communities should be monitored, 
as groups respond differently to community adaption 
programs and communication. 
Taylor et al. 
(2005) 
Information and 
Communication 
Bridge Fire 
(2003) in the 
San Bernardino 
Mountains, 
California 
Individuals relied on multiple local sources (including social 
contacts) for information on severity, size, and direction of 
the fire. 
Generalized information was of little value to at-risk 
individuals. 
News media was often viewed as inaccurate for evacuation 
purposes. 
The Incident Management Team should distribute 
information as broadly as possible in real time. 
Local-information networks should be established and 
encouraged to communicate directly with fire crews. 
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Cohn et al. 
(2006) 
Information and 
Communication 
Hayman Fire 
(2002) in Teller 
County, 
Colorado; 
Rodeo-Chediski 
Fire (2002) in 
Northern 
Arizona; 
Bucksnort/Cave 
Gulch Fire 
(2000) in 
Helena, 
Montana 
Officials and evacuees emphasized the need for clear 
communication and evacuation time estimates for 
residents. 
Electronic communication should be reinforced with 
verbal, written, and door-to-door notices. 
Specific information on evacuation status and the level of 
impact gives residents time to confirm evacuation orders. 
Real-time information on the evacuation and post-fire 
impact was useful for evacuees. 
Escorted trips into impacted areas reduced unauthorized 
entries and reassured property owners. 
Evacuees should be prepared to be away from home 
upwards of two weeks after the fire. 
Goodman and 
Proudley 
(2008) 
Social Context Wangary Fire 
(2005) in South 
Australia 
Preparedness should not only focus on actions but also on 
the roles taken by members of the household in defending 
and/or evacuating. 
Individuals with prior fire experience more readily 
recognized visual fire cues, sought information from 
informal networks, and had home defense for fires. 
Paveglio et al. 
(2010) 
Alternative 
Strategies 
Wilderness 
Ranch, Idaho 
Alternative evacuation strategies (e.g., staying and 
defending) are highly place-based, and their success is 
dependent on structural/physical and social characteristics 
of the community. 
Alternatives can differ vastly between jurisdictions, and the 
development of strategies must involve significant 
interaction between the community, emergency managers, 
and fire officials to determine all available options and 
promote informational exchange on preparedness and 
training. 
Self-reliant communities and those with a diverse mix of 
skills and abilities are better positioned to take over some 
firefighting responsibilities and develop alternative 
strategies. 
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Stidham et al. 
(2011) 
Information and 
Communication 
Black Crater 
Fire (2006) in 
Oregon; Blue 
Springs Fire 
(2005) in Utah 
Long-term relationships between homeowner associations 
and authorities (including federal authorities) produced 
effective communication channels for evacuation orders. 
Up-to-date and detailed information on fire progression 
provided reassurance to evacuees. 
Uncertainty was one of the primary stressors for evacuees. 
Without communication and transparency, fire 
management was blamed for some damages, and 
persistent rumors led to distrust and resentment toward 
local officials. 
McLennan et 
al. (2012) 
Behavior Murrindindi 
Wildfire (2009) 
in Victoria, 
Australia 
People were more likely to stay and defend if they had a 
prior commitment to a defending plan and believed that it 
was too late to evacuate. 
A significant number of people who attempted to stay and 
defend still had to flee, indicating that defenders need 
alternate plans. 
People were more likely to leave due to a trigger event that 
significantly increased fire threat, such as knowledge of 
others leaving or receiving information about the location 
of the fire from trusted sources. 
Cote and 
McGee (2014) 
Social Context Mt. Lorne, 
Yukon, Canada 
A significant number of individuals intended to stay and 
defend in a wildfire, despite lacking knowledge of how to 
defend property. 
Agencies should more proactively work with residents to 
help them understand wildfire risks and prepare them to 
stay or evacuate. 
Livestock loss was a major concern for rural residents, 
encouraging staying rather than evacuating. 
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McCaffrey et 
al. (2015) 
Social Context Painted Rocks, 
Montana; 
Ventura 
County, 
California; 
Santa Barbara, 
California; 
Santa Fe, New 
Mexico 
The primary concerns about evacuations were the 
potential for a late evacuation and the logistical costs of an 
evacuation. 
Alternative evacuation strategies (i.e., staying and 
defending) were seen to reduce logistical costs, increase 
homeowner control, and augment firefighting capabilities. 
Staying and defending approaches were viewed as full of 
unknown risks by officials. 
Residents (unlike officials) believed community members 
could understand the nuances of staying and defending. 
 
Table 2: Key Wildfire Policy and Framework Literature 
Authors 
(Year) Topic 
Key 
Location(s) Key Conclusions 
Keeley et al. 
(2004) 
Lessons Learned Southern 
California 
Massive wildfires have occurred previously in many fire-
prone areas, and future planning should focus on the 
cyclical nature of fires. 
Traditional fuel breaks or fuel reductions will not stop large 
fires in extreme weather events, and fuel manipulation 
should focus on creating safe and defensible space. 
Future development should recognize that wildfires in 
California are natural events, and fire management is 
severely limited in preventing, slowing, and stopping 
wildfires. 
MacGregor et 
al. (2007) 
Risk Perception 
Framework 
Western 
United States 
Agencies seeking to change self-protective behavior should 
focus on the unique socio-cultural characteristics of their 
local jurisdictions. 
Risk-related interventions (i.e., media events, programs, 
brochures) increased public awareness of risks. 
Interventions to change attitudes and behavior should be 
both long-term and targeted to specific populations. 
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Mutch et al. 
(2011) 
Communication 
Framework 
Painted 
Rocks, New 
Mexico; 
Rancho Santa 
Fe, California 
Most policy in the United States has focused on 
evacuations, not on alternative strategies such as staying 
and defending. 
Several US areas have implemented the “Prepare, Go Early, 
or Stay and Defend” strategy that is popular in Australia. 
Recent devastating wildfires in Australia require further 
examination of the feasibility and life-saving ability of 
strategy for the US context. 
Paveglio et al. 
(2012) 
Alternative 
Evacuation 
Strategies 
Australia and 
United States 
Populations in high-risk areas do not implement personal 
mitigation measures, even though they know about 
possible actions. 
Both evacuation and alternative strategies require clear 
and targeted messages for different populations. 
Translating nationally consistent preparedness campaigns 
(such as “Ready, Set, Go” and “Prepare, Act, Survive”) tends 
to leave out unique local characteristics. 
Disinvestment in alternative strategies may reduce fire 
mitigation behaviors, while wildfire approach and 
terminology changes may decrease trust of fire 
management. 
de Araujo et al. 
(2014) 
Traffic Control 
Framework 
Colorado 
Springs, 
Colorado 
Contraflow operations are only necessary for the most 
constrained neighborhoods with severe bottlenecks. 
Baseline strategies such as egress route restriction to 
evacuation traffic and entry restriction of non-emergency 
responders into areas was enough for most neighborhoods. 
Evacuation zones should be developed along fire lines with 
distinctive geographical differences. 
Wong, Broader, Shaheen  17 
 
DOI: 10.7922/G29G5K2R 
 
Woo et al. 
(2017) 
Lessons Learned Fort 
McMurray, 
Alberta, 
Canada 
Traffic analysis indicated that wildfire evacuations followed 
an S-curve and that evacuations occurred quickly within 12 
hours. 
Contraflow operations increased capacity, but additional 
route management could have reduced congestion. 
Contraflow operations require preplanning to reduce 
unsafe traffic situations and ensure emergency vehicle 
access. 
The success of air transportation (upwards of 23,000 
evacuated by air convoys) suggests that a multi-modal 
approach could be beneficial for sparsely populated 
geographical areas. 
 
California Case Studies 
To provide contextual background to the decision-making of wildfire evacuees, we summarize 11 recent 
wildfires in California between 2017 and 2019, beginning with the Northern California Wildfires (i.e., 
primarily composed of the Tubbs, Atlas, and Nuns Fires) in October 2017. These wildfires were chosen 
because of their recent significance and large number of evacuees. We provide an overview of these 
wildfires in Table 3. We note that official sources and secondary sources are often updating exact wildfire 
statistics, causes, and other key details. Consequently, some information in these case studies may change 
over time. 
2017 October Northern California Wildfires 
In October 2017, a series of large and fast-moving wildfires broke out in Northern California in Napa, 
Sonoma, and Solano Counties, leading to one of the deadliest wildfire disasters in California history (Serna, 
2018a). Altogether, the Tubbs, Nuns, and Atlas fires (i.e., primary fires) burned over 140,000 acres; 
required the evacuation of about 100,000 people; caused approximately $15 billion in damages; and killed 
44 people (Associated Press, 2017; Bonos et al., 2017; Cal Fire, 2018a; Cal Fire, 2018b; Cal Fire, 2018c; 
Serna, 2018a). The Tubbs, Nuns, and Atlas Fires ignited in rapid succession on October 8, overwhelming 
fire resources and emergency management officials. The Tubbs Fire ignited near Calistoga, California due 
to a failed private electrical system, spreading rapidly toward Santa Rosa due to high winds and low 
humidity (Cal Fire, 2018c). Local utility provider, Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E), was not found at fault for 
the Tubbs Fire. Due to an overwhelming number of calls of reported fires and multiple fires throughout 
the area, the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (Cal Fire) was unable to devote an 
adequate amount of resources to fight the Tubbs Fire (Wagner et al., 2017; Lewis et al., 2018). The Nuns 
Fire ignited in the community of Glen Ellen, California due to a downed tree on a power line conductor 
(Cal Fire, 2018b), later merging with five other smaller fires. The Atlas Fire ignited near the Atlas Peak area 
due to trees falling on power lines owned by PG&E in two different locations (Cal Fire, 2018a). The Atlas 
Fire spread rapidly down dry and hilly terrain into the area surrounding the city of Napa. Cal Fire and local 
fire resources attempted to contain all three major fires (along with several smaller fires), but 
deteriorating weather conditions and wind gusts over 70 miles per hour (mph) caused all fires to spread 
rapidly, straining firefighting resources (Lewis et al., 2018).
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Table 3: Overview of Major 2017 – 2019 California Wildfires 
 
Northern 
California 
Wildfires 
Southern California 
Wildfires Carr Fire 
Mendocino 
Complex 
Fire 
Camp Fire Woolsey Fire Hill Fire Saddle Ridge Fire Kincade Fire Tick Fire Getty Fire 
Location Napa, Sonoma, Solano Counties 
Ventura, Santa 
Barbara, Los 
Angeles Counties 
Shasta, 
Trinity 
Counties 
Mendocino, 
Lake, Glenn, 
Colusa 
Counties 
Butte County 
Ventura and 
Los Angeles 
Counties 
Ventura 
County 
Los Angeles 
County  
Sonoma 
County  
Los Angeles 
County 
Los Angeles 
County  
Dates 
October 8, 2017 
– October 31, 
2017 
December 4, 2017 - 
December 15, 2017 
July 23, 2018 
– August 30, 
2018 
July 27, 2018 
– September 
19, 2018 
November 8, 
2018 – 
November 25, 
2018 
November 8, 
2018 – 
November 
21, 2018 
November 8, 
2018 – 
November 
16, 2018 
October 10, 
2019 – 
October 31, 
2019 
October 23, 
2019 – 
November 6, 
2019 
October 24, 
2019 – 
October 31, 
2019 
October 28, 
2019 – 
November 5, 
2019  
Acres 
Burned 
Atlas: 51,624 
(Cal Fire, 2018a) 
Nuns: 56,556 
(Cal Fire, 2018b) 
Tubbs: 36,807 
(Cal Fire, 2018c) 
 
Creek: 15,619 (Cal 
Fire, 2018d) 
Rye: 6,049 (Cal Fire, 
2018e) 
Skirball: 422 (Cal 
Fire, 2018f) 
Thomas: 281,893 
(Cal Fire, 2018g) 
229,651 
(Cal Fire, 
2018h) 
459,123 
(Callahan, 
2018) 
153,336 
(Cal Fire, 2018j, 
2018) 
96,949 
(Cal Fire, 
2018k) 
4,531 
(Cal Fire, 
2018l) 
8,799 
(Cal Fire, 
2019a) 
77,758  
(Cal Fire, 
2019b) 
4,615 
(Rosenfeld, 
2019) 
745  
(Stewart, 
2019) 
Structures 
Destroyed 
Atlas: 120 (Cal 
Fire, 2018a) 
Nuns Fire: 1,355 
(Cal Fire 2018b) 
Tubbs: 5,626 
(Cal Fire, 2018c) 
Creek: 37 (Cal Fire, 
2018d) 
Rye: 6 (Cal Fire, 
2018e) 
Skirball: 6 (Cal Fire, 
2018f) 
Thomas: 1,063 (Cal 
Fire, 2018g) 
1,614 
(Cal Fire, 
2018h) 
280 
(Callahan, 
2018) 
18,804 
(Cal Fire 2018j, 
2018) 
1,643 
(Cal Fire, 
2018k) 
 
4 
(Cal Fire, 
2018l) 
19 
(Cal Fire, 
2019a) 
374  
(Cal Fire, 
2019b) 
22 
(SF 
Chronicle, 
2019) 
10  
(Stewart, 
2019) 
Approx. 
People 
Ordered 
to 
Evacuate 
100,000 
(Bonos et al., 
2017) 
Creek: 150,000 
(Chandler, 2017) 
Rye: 3,900 (Austin, 
2017)* 
Skirball: 46,000 
(KPCC Staff, 2017) 
Thomas: 87,000 
(Stokes, 2017) 
39,000 
(Bransford 
and Caron, 
2018) 
17,000 
(Morris and 
Espinoza, 
2019) 
52,000 
(Stead Sellers 
et al., 2018) 
250,000 
(County of 
Los Angeles, 
2018) 
17,000 
(Holland, 
2018) 
100,000 
(Kenne and 
Bogel-
Burroughs; 
2019) 
200,000 
(Asimov, 
2019) 
50,000 
(LAist Staff, 
2019) 
 
25,000 
(Shapiro et 
al., 2019) 
Fatalities 
44 
(Associated 
Press, 2017) 
2 (Serna, 2019a) 
8 
(Schultz, 
2018) 
1 
(McGough, 
2018) 
85 
(Chan and 
Sterling, 2019) 
3 
(Cosgrove, 
2018a) 
0 
1 
(Salahieh and 
Lyster, 2019) 
0 0 0 
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Cause 
Atlas: Trees 
falling on Pacific 
Gas & Electric 
power lines (Cal 
Fire, 2018a) 
Nuns: Downed 
tree on electric 
lines (Cal Fire, 
2018b) 
Tubbs: Sparks 
from private 
electrical system 
(Cal Fire, 2018c) 
 
Creek: Under 
investigation (St. 
John and Mejia, 
2017) 
Rye: Under 
investigation (Holt 
and Dave, 2017) 
Skirball: Illegal 
cooking fire (Los 
Angeles Fire 
Department, 2017) 
Thomas: Slapping of 
Southern California 
Edison power lines 
(Serna, 2019a) 
Sparks from 
a vehicle 
with a flat 
tire 
(Agbonile, 
2018) 
Sparks from 
a hammer 
(Ranch), 
unknown 
(River) 
(Arango and 
Medina, 
2018) 
Transmission 
tower hook 
failure (Van 
Derbeken, 
2019) 
Likely caused 
by a 
malfunction 
of Southern 
California 
Edison’s 
electrical 
equipment 
(Rokos, 2019) 
Human 
activity 
(ABC7 Staff, 
2018) 
Under 
investigation 
(Cosgrove, 
2019c) 
Under 
investigation 
(Stanglin, 
2019) 
Under 
investigation 
(Rosenfeld, 
2019) 
Tree branch 
hitting 
electrical 
lines 
(Stewart, 
2019) 
* 1,300 households were ordered to evacuate (Austin, 2017), multiplied by the approximate average number of persons per household (3) for Santa Clarita (U.S. Census Bureau, 2019) 
  
Photo 1: Severe congestion from evacuating vehicles from the 2018 
Carr Fire (Source: Redding Record Searchlight) 
 
Photo 2: Traffic along the Pacific Coast Highway during the 2018 
Woolsey Fire (Source: Cassie Denham) 
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The swift growth of the fires from deteriorating weather conditions heightened the importance of 
efficient communication. However, significant communication challenges arose due to delays in receiving 
messages; concerns that certain communication systems – such as the Wireless Emergency Alert (WEA) 
system – would reach wider geographic areas than necessary; difficulty in establishing multi-jurisdictional 
coordination between emergency operation centers (e.g., between the City of Santa Rosa, Sonoma 
County Office of Emergency Management, and the Sonoma County Sheriff’s Office); and poor adoption of 
modern communication technologies (Sonoma County Civil Grand Jury, 2018). These communication 
issues caused significant delays in the distribution of mandatory evacuation orders. Without official 
evacuation notices, neighbors and emergency personnel resorted to community action tactics to notify 
people through police and fire sirens, loudspeakers, car horns, megaphones, and door-to-door 
notifications (Sonoma County Civil Grand Jury, 2018). 
The 2017 October Northern California Wildfires led to the evacuation of about 100,000 people in Sonoma, 
Napa, and Solano Counties (Bonos et al., 2017), along with the evacuation of several regional medical 
facilities (Sonoma County Civil Grand Jury, 2018). Residents faced significant challenges while evacuating 
including power outages preventing people from opening their garage doors, downed trees trapping 
people in their vehicles, congestion on evacuation routes, and road closures (Lewis, 2018). The speed of 
the fires forced some people to abandon their vehicles and evacuate on foot (Lewis, 2018). A challenge 
specific to the Atlas Fire was Atlas Peak Road, which serves as the only entrance and exit to the 
community. People trapped on this road had to be helicoptered to safety (Lewis, 2018). Local and regional 
transit services were able to evacuate people from assisted living facilities, apartments, homes, and 
hospitals in the Napa, Yountville, and Calistoga areas (Napa Valley Register, 2017).  
People evacuated to shelters at the Petaluma Fairgrounds, Finley Community Center in Santa Rosa, Napa 
County Fairgrounds in Calistoga, Crosswalk Community Church in Napa, and additional shelters in Marin 
and Solano Counties (Digitale, 2017; Santa Rosa Police Department, 2017; Sorci and Kipling, 2017). The 
American Red Cross (ARC) arrived later than anticipated, since the organization was concurrently 
providing aid for another disaster in the state (Sonoma County Civil Grand Jury, 2018). While containment 
grew slowly for all fires, light rain in the region on October 19 allowed firefighters to gain a better foothold 
(Kohli, 2017). The primary fires – the Tubbs, Nuns, and Atlas Fires – reached 100% containment by October 
31, 2017, although most residents were able to return home before that date (Rossmann, 2017). 
2017 December Southern California Wildfires 
The 2017 December Southern California Wildfires were made up of four major fires – the Thomas, Creek, 
Skirball, and Rye Fires – that surrounded the Greater Los Angeles metropolitan area and led to over 
286,000 evacuations (Chandler, 2017; Austin, 2017; KPCC Staff, 2017; Stokes, 2017). A fifth major fire, the 
Lilac Fire, concurrently impacted San Diego County. The Thomas Fire was first to ignite, beginning in the 
evening of December 4. The fire was caused by strong winds, leading high-voltage power lines owned by 
Southern California Edison, a local utility company, to slap together (Serna, 2019a). The “line slap” caused 
hot and molten materials to fall into the dry brush below, sparking the destructive Thomas Fire (Serna, 
2019a). The Thomas Fire would later become the largest fire in California history, burning 281,893 acres 
(Cal Fire, 2017g). A few hours later on December 4, the Creek Fire began on the hillside of Little Tujunga 
Canyon near Kagel Canyon (Cal Fire, 2017d; St. John and Mejia, 2017). While some witnesses claim the 
fire began from sparks from a transmission line, the cause of the fire remains under investigation. The Rye 
Fire began shortly after and proceeded to consume 3,000 acres within five hours (Woods II and Yee, 2017; 
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Cal Fire, 2018e). As of December 2019, the cause of the Rye Fire was still under investigation. Two days 
later, on December 6, the Skirball Fire began (Los Angeles Fire Department, 2017). The Skirball Fire was 
caused by an illegal cooking fire at a brush-filled campsite near a freeway overpass and heavily impacted 
the Bel-Air neighborhood in Los Angeles (Los Angeles Fire Department, 2017; Cal Fire, 2018f).   
During the Thomas Fire, the Ventura County Sheriff’s Office of Emergency Services set up a hotline to 
handle the large volume of emergency calls. Despite this effort, many individuals did not know about the 
hotline, especially if they were not registered for subscription-based emergency alerts (Carlson, 2018). 
The strong Santa Ana winds (up to 70 mph) led to rapid fire spread over the next several days, resulting 
in mandatory evacuations of large areas of Ventura, Ojai, Carpinteria, Montecito, and Santa Barbara from 
the Thomas Fire (Fritz, 2017). The widespread evacuation orders in the Ventura area due to the Thomas 
Fire led to congestion on several major roadways and arterial streets (O’Neal, 2017). Residents evacuating 
from the Skirball Fire faced similar challenges with congestion as people evacuated from a 3.2-mile zone 
at the same time (Etehad et al., 2017).  In addition, nearly 20 square miles of residential property were 
evacuated for the Creek Fire (Mejia and Serna, 2017). An additional 1,300 homes were evacuated to 
protect residents from the Rye Fire (Etehad and Nelson, 2017). Many local transit operators reduced 
service due to the smoke and embers in the air. However, Gold Coast Transit maintained bus service to 
Community Memorial Hospital and Ventura County Medical Center and was prepared to use its buses and 
wheelchair-equipped vans for evacuations if requested by emergency personnel (Gold Coast Transit, 
2017). Six shelters were opened to house evacuees of the Southern California Wildfires (O’Neal, 2017). 
Despite the lower loss of life from the 2017 December Southern California Wildfires, a series of mudslides 
in Montecito in January 2018 killed 23 people (Ventura County Star, 2018). The mudslides were caused by 
significant rainfall in the Thomas Fire burn scar, leading to unstable soil conditions and a rapid flow of mud 
and debris through neighborhoods. 
Carr Fire 
The Carr Fire began on July 23, 2018 in Shasta County, California and was caused by sparks from a vehicle 
with a flat tire (Agbonile, 2018; Schleuss et al., 2018). The fire was not contained until August 30, 
meanwhile burning over 229,000 acres; destroying about 1,600 structures; leading to the evacuation of 
approximately 39,000 people; causing the death of eight people; and costing an estimated $1.5 billion in 
damages (Bransford and Caron, 2018; Cal Fire, 2018h; Schultz, 2018). The Carr Fire moved slowly at first, 
but its growth was fueled by low humidity (under 10%), high temperatures (100+ degrees Fahrenheit), 
and dry vegetation (Schultz and Shulman, 2018). The Carr Fire advanced rapidly to the east, resulting in 
the evacuation of French Gulch, Old Shasta, and Keswick (Espino et al., 2018). Conditions worsened 
significantly, leading officials to evacuate multiple urban neighborhoods in Redding. The fire jumped the 
Sacramento River, partially due to fire whirls and fire tornados with winds upwards of 140 mph. The 
intensity of flames also created a localized weather system (NPS, 2018). Through the efforts of 4,500 
firefighting personnel and favorable weather conditions, movement through Redding and northern and 
western rural communities was slowed, and the Carr Fire was finally contained at the end of August 2018 
(NPS, 2018).  
During the height of the wildfire, the Shasta County Sheriff’s Office employed a variety of techniques to 
communicate with residents including door-to-door alerts, Code Red reverse-911 calls, a county-based 
emergency alert system, and the WEA system provided by the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA). While WEA included mobile phones and reached the largest geographic area, some residents who 
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did not need to evacuate still received mandatory evacuation orders (Cal Fire, 2018h). Communication 
confusion was furthered by the erratic behavior of the fire and significant delays in residents receiving 
evacuation orders. Residents reported receiving orders anywhere between 30 minutes to 12 hours before 
they needed to evacuate (Serna, 2018b). A Los Angeles Times investigation identified additional 
communication flaws such as the use of an outdated landline and mobile phone list (Serna and Sahagun, 
2018). During the evacuation, evacuees encountered significant challenges with blocked or congested 
roadways (Johnson et al., 2018). Many people evacuated to local shelters at Shasta College, Simpson 
University, Cross Point Community Church, Foothill High School and Trinity High School (Schleuss et al., 
2018). While the Carr Fire burned multiple neighborhoods of Redding, the majority of the city including 
the downtown was saved. 
Mendocino Complex Fire 
The Mendocino Complex Fire, the largest wildfire in California history, burned nearly 460,000 acres in 
Mendocino, Lake, Colusa, and Glenn Counties in Northern California (Callahan, 2018). The fire threatened 
1,050 structures; destroyed 280 structures; and caused three injuries and one death (Callahan, 2018; 
McGough, 2018; Cal Fire, 2018i).  The Mendocino Complex Fire was comprised of two fires burning at the 
same time – the River Fire and the Ranch Fire (Calfas, 2018). The Ranch Fire was caused by sparks from a 
hammer hitting a metal stake into the ground (Arango and Medina, 2018; Serna, 2019b), while the cause 
of the River Fire remains unknown. Due to a weather system that brought hot, dry, and windy conditions 
to the area, the fire spread rapidly (Cal Fire, 2018i). The fire burned for 54 days, from July 27 to September 
19, before being 100% contained (McGough, 2018). The Mendocino Complex Fire required the evacuation 
of 17,000 people before its complete containment (Morris and Espinoza, 2018). 
Government agencies alerted residents to the Mendocino Complex Fire through multiple mechanisms 
including: door-to-door notifications; loudspeakers on emergency vehicles; WEA; and a county-based 
emergency alert system (Sanchez and Thanawala, 2018). The alert systems faced shortcomings due to 
preregistration requirements and the lack of mobile phone service in some areas (Sanchez and Thanawala, 
2018). The Habematolel Pomo Native American tribe also assisted in notifying residents in the Upper Lake 
area by going door-to-door to inform people of evacuation orders; helped people evacuate when needed; 
and marked empty homes for law enforcement officers (Johnson et al., 2018).   
Some residents chose to stay to protect their homes from the fire and looters, safeguard their animals, 
and continue to run businesses (Arango, 2018). Other residents expressed mistrust of government 
mandated evacuations, leading some to remain behind (Arango, 2018). Residents who remained in their 
homes, particularly those who stayed to hose down their property to protect it from fire, challenged 
firefighting efforts by decreasing water available in fire hydrants (Arango, 2018). With a significant number 
of abandoned pets and livestock, the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (ASPCA) 
partnered with Lake County Care and Control to rescue and shelter domesticated animals who had been 
left behind, lost, or displaced by the Mendocino Complex Fire (Robertson, 2018). By August 7, this 
partnership had collected more than 2,500 animals from local residences, and the animals were cared for 
in specialized trailers (Robertson, 2018). While structural damages were much lower for the Mendocino 
Complex Fire than other California fires, over $200 million was spent on fire suppression. The rural 
environment, while increasing the number of acres burned, limited evacuations and threats to urban 
structures. 
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Camp Fire 
In November 2018, the Camp Fire severely impacted Butte County in California and the town of Paradise, 
burning a total of 153,336 acres (Cal Fire, 2018j; Wootson, 2018). The Camp Fire was caused by the failure 
of a steel hook on a PG&E transmission tower (Van Derbeken, 2018; Eavis, 2019). The Camp Fire led to a 
rapid and chaotic evacuation of 52,000 people and caused the death of 85 people, making it the deadliest 
wildfire in California and one of the deadliest wildfires in United States history (Stead Sellers et al., 2018; 
Wootson, 2018; Chan and Sterling, 2019). The Camp Fire left 18,804 structures destroyed in its wake, 
more than 13,000 of which were single-family residences (Cal Fire 2018j; Ravani, 2018; Alexander, 2019). 
The town of Paradise had recently developed an evacuation plan that included a variety of communication 
tools to alert residents of a mandatory evacuation (Emergency Services Information, 2017). However, 
these communication tools faced shortcomings during the Camp Fire due to damaged power lines, 
residents using the bandwidth on the remaining lines to make phone calls , limited emergency dispatcher 
staff, lack of citizen registration for alerts, and a telephone system that could not handle the capacity of 
some alert systems (e.g., CodeRed – a messaging system designed to release a message to hundreds of 
thousands of phones per minute) (St. John and Serna, 2018; Krieger, 2018).  Strong winds (40 to 50 mph) 
and low humidity (11 to 20%) led to the rapid growth of the fire, and officials were unable to notify all 
neighborhoods in time (Krieger, 2018; Belles, 2018).  
Despite plans to conduct a phased evacuation, Paradise residents were forced to evacuate all at the same 
time, leading to considerable congestion on evacuation routes. Routes were already congested due to the 
rapid movement of the fire, obstructions on the roadways, and fire-impacted routes (St. John and Serna, 
2018; Serna et al., 2018). As the fire continued to grow and congestion increased, people were forced to 
drive on road shoulders to avoid the flames and sometimes to escape on foot. Evacuees took shelter 
across the area, particularly in Chico, at families’ and friends’ residences, hotels, campsites, make-shift 
shelters in parking lots, and ARC shelters (Wootson, 2018). Some shelters faced considerable difficulties 
in maintaining quality of life due to adverse weather conditions and spread of illness (Stead Sellers et al., 
2018). Additional information about the Camp Fire can be found in Zhao et al. (2019). 
Woolsey Fire 
The Woolsey Fire began on November 8, 2018 in Ventura County, California, and was likely caused by a 
malfunction in one of Southern California Edison’s power lines (Cosgrove, 2019a; Cosgrove, 2019b; Rokos, 
2019). The fire grew rapidly due to strong Santa Ana winds (Chandler, 2018). These winds, paired with low 
humidity (5%) and ample amounts of dry fuels, quickly spread the fire through Ventura and Los Angeles 
Counties (Chandler, 2018). Los Angeles County stated that the previous years of drought and construction 
of buildings in high fire-risk areas added to the destruction. The Woolsey Fire burned from November 8 
to November 21, leading to an evacuation of about 250,000 people (County of Los Angeles, 2018). The 
fire was fought by 300 Los Angeles County firefighters, with the aid of approximately 3,000 firefighters 
from outside the county and state (County of Los Angeles, 2018). By the time it was contained, the 
Woolsey Fire burned nearly 97,000 acres and destroyed approximately 1,600 structures (Cal Fire, 2018k; 
Cosgrove, 2019a; Rokos, 2019). The fire demonstrated the need to prepare physical infrastructure and 
communication resources for residents (County of Los Angeles, 2019). The fire also exposed gaps in 
firefighting resources, as the concurrent Hill Fire received the bulk of firefighting resources early on, 
playing a key role in the rapid development of the Woolsey Fire (Cosgrove, 2019a). 
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Most people evacuated from the Woolsey fire via personal vehicles (Sawicki, 2018). This led to heavy 
congestion, particularly on the Pacific Coast Highway, which acted as the main evacuation route for 
thousands of people in a 14-mile zone and especially near Malibu (Sawicki, 2018; Walker, 2018). Through 
a coordinated effort between multiple agencies and jurisdictions, officials were eventually able to change 
all lanes of the Pacific Coast Highway to flow away from the fire through contraflow (Sawicki, 2018; 
Walker, 2018). Some non-governmental organizations (NGOs) intervened and helped transport people 
during and after the Woolsey Fire. These organizations, including United Way and the ARC, partnered with 
private sharing economy companies including Lyft and Uber (Wong and Shaheen, 2019a; Wong and 
Shaheen, 2019b). The ARC opened eight shelters for evacuees of the Woolsey and Hill fires (American Red 
Cross, 2019). ARC volunteers continued to assist after shelters were closed by offering one-on-one support 
for victims and delivering emergency and recovery supplies to areas affected by the fires. 
Hill Fire  
The Hill Fire broke out on November 8, 2018 in a rural area of the Santa Rosa Valley in Ventura County 
(Cal Fire, 2019l; Bay Area News Group, 2018). The fire, attributed to human causes, burned for eight days, 
charring approximately 4,500 acres (ABC7 Staff, 2018; Hersko, 2018; Cal Fire, 2018l). In addition to the 
acreage burned, the Hill Fire threatened 400 buildings, destroyed four buildings, and necessitated the 
evacuation of 17,000 people (Cal Fire, 2018l; Public Information Officer Ventura County Fire Department, 
2018a). The rapid growth of the fire was caused by low humidity and strong Santa Ana winds (Licas and 
Gundran, 2018). In addition, on the same day that the Hill Fire ignited, the Woolsey Fire sparked 15 miles 
to the east (Cosgrove, 2019a). The two simultaneously burning fires led to the division of firefighting 
resources and necessitated the request for aid from outside the Ventura County area (Cosgrove, 2019a). 
As of December 2019, officials had not identified the cause of the Hill Fire beyond that it was started by 
human actions (Campos, 2018; Hersko, 2018). 
During the fire, the Ventura County Fire Department encouraged people to sign up to receive emergency 
alerts, provided information hotlines, and leveraged social media accounts in both English and Spanish 
(Ventura County Fire, 2018; Public Information Officer Ventura County Fire Department, 2018b). The Hill 
Fire led to the closure of four schools and multiple roads in the area, including Highway 101 (Jackson and 
Hamasaki, 2018). Two evacuation centers were established for evacuees, and three shelters were 
established for animals (Lloyd, 2018). Private organizations including Uber, Lyft, and Airbnb also offered 
assistance to evacuees for the general areas impacted by the Woolsey and Hill Fires (Wong and Shaheen, 
2019a; Wong and Shaheen, 2019b). While the Hill Fire was slowed and contained quickly, the decision to 
focus more on the Hill Fire during the initial outbreak diverted key resources away from the Woolsey Fire 
(Cosgrove, 2019a). 
Saddle Ridge Fire 
The Saddle Ridge Fire burned from October 10, 2019 to October 31, 2019 in the San Fernando Valley area 
of Los Angeles County (Cal Fire, 2019a). The Saddle Ridge Fire burned 8,799 acres; damaged 88 structures; 
destroyed 19 structures; and injured eight people (Cal Fire, 2019a; Plachta, 2019). In addition, one person 
died due to cardiac arrest while trying to protect their home from the fire (Salahieh and Lyster, 2019). 
Approximately 23,000 homes and 100,000 people were evacuated, but a significant number of people 
disregarded the orders and stayed behind to protect their homes (Keene and Bogel-Burroughs, 2019; 
Miller et al., 2019). As of December 2019, the cause of the fire was still under investigation, although 
authorities have determined that it began under a transmission tower (Cosgrove, 2019c). In addition, 
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reports found that the Southern California Edison electrical system was impacted minutes before the fire 
ignited (Shalby, 2019). Strong Santa Ana winds and low humidity (around 12%) led the fire to become very 
“dynamic” and move swiftly (CBS Staff, 2019). The area impacted had been identified by Cal Fire as a “very 
high fire hazard severity zone” (CBS Staff, 2019). Residents reported poor communication, and many 
neighborhoods were evacuated by authorities driving through streets with a bullhorn (CBS Staff, 2019). 
Eight shelters were opened for evacuees, although many reached capacity shortly after the fire started 
(Plachta, 2019). Cooler temperatures, cool coastal winds, and higher humidity levels helped firefighters 
gain control over the fire (Miller et al., 2019).  
Kincade Fire 
The Kincade Fire began on October 23, 2019 and burned until November 6, 2019 in the Geyserville area 
of Sonoma County (Cal Fire, 2019b). By the time of its containment, the fire had burned 77,758 acres; 
damaged 60 structures; destroyed 374 structures; injured four people; and required the evacuation of 
200,000 people (Cal Fire, 2019b; Asimov, 2019). As of December 2019, the cause of the Kincade Fire had 
not been determined, but PG&E remains under investigation as the potential cause. PG&E had turned off 
power to many (but not all) power lines in Sonoma County as a proactive measure to prevent wildfires 
(Stanglin, 2019). However, the line near where the Kincade Fire sparked was still in service. PG&E 
registered an outage on the line seven minutes before the fire began (Stanglin, 2019).  
The power outages for nearly 28,000 residents in the area led to challenges with communication and 
firefighting (Alexander and Cassidy, 2019). About 17% of cell towers in Sonoma County lost power, while 
a significant number of landlines were out of service (Krieger, 2019). Residents depended on flashlights 
and camping lights to navigate through their homes and on streets as they tried to evacuate. These 
challenges were amplified by thick smoke and falling ash (Alexander and Cassidy, 2019). In addition, 
residents could not charge their phones and laptops and were unable to receive emergency notification 
alerts (Alexander and Cassidy, 2019). Firefighters were equally challenged by the power outages. 
Firefighters were unable to use electricity-based devices (e.g., phones, computers) to communicate and 
draw water from electric pumps (Alexander and Cassidy, 2019). Evacuees faced challenges finding housing 
due to power outages, fully booked hotels, and packed shelters (Sweeney, 2019). Community aid shelters, 
such as one in Healdsburg, distributed resources provided by local organizations, non-profits, and public 
agencies (Schmitt, 2019).  
Tick Fire 
The Tick Fire began on October 24, 2019 in the Santa Clarita Valley of Los Angeles County and reached 
containment a week later (San Francisco Chronicle, 2019). The cause of the fire is under investigation 
(Rosenfeld, 2019). Shortly before the ignition of the fire, residents experienced loud booms, followed by 
a plume of smoke and flames (Rosenfeld, 2019). By the time of containment, the Tick Fire burned 4,615 
acres; destroyed 22 structures; threatened 600 structures; and necessitated the evacuation of 
approximately 50,000 residents (Rosenfeld, 2019; SF Chronicle, 2019; LAist Staff, 2019a; Jennings, 2019; 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2019b). The spread of the Tick Fire was aided by strong Santa 
Ana winds, which pushed the fire into residential neighborhoods (Jennings, 2019). The Tick Fire led to the 
opening of two shelters for evacuees in the nearby town of Santa Clarita and four animal shelters. The 
Tick Fire also led to the closure of two roads and the closure of schools in four school districts (LAist Staff, 
2019a). 
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Southern California Edison, the utility provider for the area, turned off power to the area as a 
precautionary measure to stop the spread of the fire. This power shutoff led to challenges in 
communicating and evacuating as the Tick Fire grew. Many of the emergency communication methods 
used in Los Angeles County relied on the Internet and cell towers, making the methods vulnerable to 
power outages (Gerber and Rainey, 2019). Smoke and poor street lighting added to confusion and 
congestion during the evacuation (Gerber and Rainey, 2019). As people moved toward safety, the ARC, 
along with partner organizations, provided aid and supplied over 4,900 overnight stays; served more than 
10,100 meals; and connected 1,200 people with family members (American Red Cross, 2019). A variety of 
private companies offered support for housing, transportation, and storage to those affected by the Tick 
Fire. These companies included Airbnb, U-Haul, Lyft, and Uber (Fortin-Caldera, 2019).  
Getty Fire 
The Getty Fire began on October 28, 2019 and burned until reaching containment about one week later 
(Stewart, 2019). The Getty Fire was started by strong wind gusts, which caused a tree branch to hit Los 
Angeles Department of Water and Power electricity lines (Stewart, 2019). The fire was located in the 
Brentwood and Pacific Palisades neighborhoods of Los Angeles, some of the most populous 
neighborhoods in the area (Irfan, 2019). The Getty Fire threatened 10,000 homes; damaged 15 residences; 
destroyed 10 residences; injured five firefighters; burned a total of 745 acres; and required the evacuation 
of nearly 25,000 people (Stewart, 2019; Shapiro et al., 2019). The National Weather Service issued an 
extreme red flag warning the day after the Getty Fire broke out, based on the humidity, temperatures, 
and wind speeds of the environment (LAist Staff, 2019b). Los Angeles followed suit and put into place its 
Red Flag Parking Program, which tickets people for parking in identified “Very High Fire Severity Zones” 
(LAist Staff, 2019b).  
The Getty Center (a modern art museum) was used as a staging area, rest area, and logistics base for 
firefighting personnel (Gelt, 2019). The museum and art within were protected by a series of mitigation 
techniques including: preemptive brush clearing; fire-resistant landscape; a million-gallon water reserve 
system; fire-resistant building exterior; and a sophisticated air filtration system (Gelt, 2019). The Getty 
Fire also threatened major transportation assets, including the I-405 highway (Irfan, 2019). Five shelters 
for people and three shelters for animals were opened to assist evacuees (LAist Staff, 2019b).  
Los Angeles’ emergency alert system, which sends alerts to smartphones, received criticism for sending 
out a Spanish notification five hours after an English alert was released and for the inequitable design of 
the system (Shyong, 2019). The system was Roman character based, excluding other languages, and 
specifically targeted smartphones (Shyong, 2019). The Los Angeles Fire Department and Police 
Department also received criticism for allowing domestic workers (e.g., housekeepers, gardeners) to enter 
or remain in evacuated areas (Shyong, 2019). 
Comparison of California Wildfire Case Studies 
Key Similarities 
Comparing across California case studies, we found several similarities indicating critical issues that will 
likely arise in future California wildfires (Table 4). These similarities may also be present for other wildfires 
in the United States beyond California. We first found that all wildfires were directly or indirectly started 
by humans. The ignition involved actions directly related to humans (e.g., sparks created by a hammer, 
sparks created by a vehicle with a flat tire) or more indirectly related by debris hitting power lines. The 
variety of human causes indicates that humans will continue to play an outsized role in starting wildfires, 
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as compared to natural sources (e.g., lightning). We found fires spread very rapidly in all cases, fueled by 
dry vegetation and high winds. Low humidity and high temperatures often exacerbated these fires. Fire 
also spread rapidly along the WUI (wildland-urban interface), causing significant evacuations and 
threatening neighborhoods and cities. Regarding communication, we found that jurisdictions had a variety 
of options to communicate with the public, but not all methods were selected. In a number of wildfires, 
this led to severe communication challenges that resulted in significant delays in issuing mandatory 
evacuation orders. Regardless of the wildfire, communication challenges were present, but the degree 
differed depending on the scale of the fire and the preparedness of the jurisdiction.  
For the evacuation process, we found that areas containing difficult roads faced challenges in evacuating. 
Moreover, neighborhoods with single exits and roads with debris were difficult to evacuate, often leading 
to severe congestion. This congestion was exacerbated by the preference to evacuate with personal 
vehicles. Despite this preference, transit agencies across California deployed resources to help evacuate 
residents or were ready to assist if called to help. Increased integration of public transit with emergency 
management may help to further improve transit-assisted evacuations. For sheltering, the ARC played an 
instrumental role in sheltering evacuees across wildfires. Finally, for reentry, we found that a number of 
organizations (including community-based organizations [CBOs] and non-governmental organizations 
[NGOs]) and government agencies offered assistance during the reentry and recovery process. However, 
formalized reentry plans were severely lacking, leading to confusion over when residents would be 
allowed to return. 
Additional Characteristics 
Along with these similarities, each wildfire exhibited characteristics relevant to fire context, geographical 
factors, and evacuation process (Tables 5 to 7). We note that these tables do not necessarily show unique 
differences. Indeed, many fires exhibited similar challenges and issues (e.g., power outages, full shelters). 
Rather, the tables describe by fire the most relevant characteristics for cause, fire behavior, 
communication, evacuation, sheltering, and reentry. More in-depth characteristics for each wildfire can 
be found in the variety of sources provided following each table. Additional characteristics will be issued 
in a working paper by the International Association of Fire Safety Science, which collects case studies of 
wildfires across the world.  
Overall, we found not all causes of major California wildfires were associated with electrical power. 
Several other causes, including sparks from a vehicle with a flat tire (Carr Fire) and a hammer (Mendocino 
Complex Fire), would not have been avoided if power had been shut off. Fire behavior also differed 
between the fires. For example, fire whirls were reported for the Carr Fire, which caused additional fire 
spread. Early reports of a more intense fire (the Hill Fire) caused a significant diversion of resources away 
from the Woolsey Fire, making the Woolsey Fire much more destructive. In addition, some wildfires 
involved significant house-to-house fire spread (particularly the Camp Fire), which increased property 
damage. 
Several wildfires impacted areas that were also subjected to public safety power shutoff (PSPS) events. 
The lack of power hampered communications as cell towers and landlines lost connection. Reduced lights 
also decreased visibility during the evacuations. One critical lesson from these fires is that mechanisms 
need to be in place to communicate with residents without power. Low-tech options including sirens or 
door-to-door notifications may be necessary to alert residents. Communication methods also varied 
across wildfires, with some agencies relying on social media while others implemented the WEA system. 
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While it is unclear which single method is most effective, multiple methods are preferred to reach as many 
residents as possible. We also found that agencies had differing abilities to communicate in other 
languages, with officials communicating effectively in Spanish (Hill Fire) but failing to release multilingual 
orders at the same time or in enough languages (Getty Fire). Despite ongoing challenges, communication 
of mandatory evacuation orders has generally improved over the past three years, due in part to lessons 
learned and improved emergency response plans. 
Regarding evacuations, we found several transportation responses that were not implemented in all 
wildfires. First, during the Atlas Fire (part of the 2017 Northern California Wildfires), trees fell across Atlas 
Peak road, the only exit road for some residents, and residents were rescued by helicopter. The response 
highlights the need for flexible transportation options. In several fires, hospitals were pre-evacuated to 
ensure continuity of care for those who faced the highest risk from smoke or a power outage (Carr Fire). 
In the Mendocino Complex Fire, a significant number of residents did not evacuate due to their fear of 
looting and mistrust of the government. These concerns need to be addressed in future wildfires, 
particularly in rural areas of California with a stronger culture of independence. During the Camp Fire, 
congestion was particularly bad for officials, and some residents had to evacuate on foot. On the other 
hand, officials in Los Angeles instituted a Red Flag Parking Program to clear vehicles parked on major 
evacuation and first responder routes (Woolsey Fire, Getty Fire). Officials also conducted a contraflow 
process on the Pacific Coast Highway for the Woolsey Fire. In several unique instances, entire interstates 
were forced closed by wildfires such as Highway 101 (Hill Fire), parts of highways in the San Fernando 
Valley (Saddle Ridge Fire), and Interstate 5 (Tick Fire). Overall, dense smoke from several fires in 2019 
(Kincade Fire, Tick Fire) significantly lowered visibility and added risk to the evacuation process. 
Table 4: Key Similarities Across All Major 2017 to 2019 California Wildfires 
 Key Similarities Across Wildfires 
Cause Humans, either directly or indirectly, were involved in the fires’ ignition and spread. 
Fire Behavior High levels of dry vegetation and high winds exacerbated the spread of fires. 
Communication Jurisdictions had a variety of communication options they could employ, but not all were selected for each wildfire, leading to communication challenges. 
Evacuation 
Areas with single road entry, windy roads, or debris-blocked roads were difficult to 
evacuate. 
Most people evacuated via personal vehicle, and most evacuees experienced 
significant congestion. 
Local transportation agencies assisted (or were willing to assist) in most evacuations. 
Sheltering 
The ARC and local organizations were instrumental in providing aid via shelters. 
Shelters filled quickly with evacuees. 
Reentry Residents were offered resources for reentry from a variety of organizations (e.g., public agencies, private organizations), but formalized plans were lacking. 
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Table 5: Key Characteristics Across Major 2017 California Wildfires 
 
2017 October Northern California Wildfires 2017 December Southern California Wildfires 
Cause Downed trees on power lines and faulty private electrical equipment ignited the fires. 
Slapping of Southern California Edison’s power 
lines, an illegal cooking fire, and unknown causes 
led to the ignition of the fires. 
Fire Behavior Fire spread rapidly over manmade fire break (Highway 101). Santa Ana winds spread the flames quickly. 
Communication 
Agencies chose not to use the WEA system due to concerns that the 
WEA would reach larger than necessary geographic areas. 
Agencies faced challenges with coordinating across jurisdictions. 
Agencies offered a hotline as the primary way to 
communicate with residents, but residents who 
had not registered for subscription alert services 
may not have known about the hotline. 
Evacuation 
Debris blocked a road that serves as a single exit for a community and 
residents had to be helicoptered to safety. 
Some residents were unable to access their vehicles due to lack of 
power (i.e., unable to open garage doors) and rapid spread of fire. 
Officials quickly ordered evacuations for large 
numbers of residents. 
Ambulances evacuated people from medical 
centers. 
Sheltering Several shelters were under threat of fire. Multiple fires burning concurrently stretched the resources of the shelters. 
Reentry 
Local transit agencies offered free transportation service to assist 
people in the reentry process. 
Many residents reentered before the fire was at 100% containment. 
The shorter duration of several fires allowed 
people to reenter relatively quickly. 
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Sources 
Bonos et al., 2017; Digitale, 2017;  Golden Gate Transit, 2017; Lewis et al., 
2018; Lewis, 2018; Morris, 2018; Napa Valley Register, 2017; O’Neill et al., 
2018; Petaluma Argus-Courier, 2017; Press Democrat, 2018; Rodriguez et al., 
2017; Sonoma County Civil Grand Jury, 2018; The Greater Marin, 2017;  
Watkins et al., 2017; Waxmann, 2017 
Carlson, 2018; Chandler, 2017; Daily News Staff, 
2017a, 2017b; Gold Coast Transit, 2017; Holt and 
Dave, 2017; Mejia and Serna, 2017; Myers, 2017; 
O’Neal, 2017; The New York Times, 2017; Yam and 
Vives, 2017  
 
Table 6: Key Characteristics Across Major 2018 California Wildfires 
 Carr Fire Mendocino Complex Fire Camp Fire Woolsey Fire Hill Fire 
Cause 
The fire was caused by 
sparks from a vehicle 
with a flat tire. 
One fire was caused by 
sparks from a hammer. 
PG&E transmission tower 
hook failure caused the 
fire. 
The fire was likely 
caused by the failure 
of a Southern 
California Edison 
(SCE) power line. 
The cause of the 
fire is currently 
unknown but 
attributed to 
human activity. 
Fire Behavior 
The intensity of the fire 
and wind gusts led to 
fire whirls, which caused 
additional spread and a 
jump over the 
Sacramento River. 
The River and Ranch 
Fires burned 
simultaneously, 
including through 
remote areas of the 
Mendocino National 
Forest.  
A state of emergency 
was declared by the 
California governor due 
to sheer size of the fires. 
The large footprint of the 
fire destroyed much of the 
area’s housing stock. 
In some instances, fire 
spread from house to 
house. 
 
Construction in high-
risk areas allowed 
the fire to spread 
rapidly from house 
to house. 
Firefighting 
resources were 
divided between the 
Woolsey and Hill 
Fires, decreasing 
response 
capabilities. 
The fire was 
classified as a 
higher threat than 
the nearby 
Woolsey Fire and 
therefore received 
more firefighting 
resources. 
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Communication 
Communication gaps 
occurred due to 
challenges predicting the 
fire’s course and 
shortcomings of alert 
systems (e.g., outdated 
phone lists). 
Lack of mobile phone 
service in a mostly rural 
area posed challenges 
for communication. 
The localized alert 
system had some 
shortcomings (e.g., only 
reaching pre-registered 
mobile phones). 
Destruction of telephone 
lines and loss of power 
decreased communication 
capacity and hindered 
communication measures. 
Existing 
telecommunications 
infrastructure could not 
support CodeRed alert 
system. 
Agencies, with 
limited methods for 
communication, 
used outlets 
including social 
media and pre-
registered 
emergency alert 
lists.  
Local public 
agencies used 
their social media 
accounts to keep 
residents 
informed. 
Alerts were sent 
out in Spanish and 
English. 
Evacuation 
First responders caused 
congestion on major 
evacuation routes as 
they attempted to 
respond to the fire. 
Buses were used to 
evacuate local medical 
centers. 
People with select needs 
(e.g., premature babies) 
were evacuated early to 
specialized facilities. 
Some residents actively 
chose not to evacuate 
for a variety of reasons 
(e.g., fear of looting, 
mistrust of government). 
Narrow, windy roads led to 
large amounts of 
congestion. 
Bottlenecks occurred 
within Paradise and near 
Chico. 
Fire moved so quickly that 
many people had to 
evacuate on foot. 
Officials 
implemented 
contraflow on the 
Pacific Coast 
Highway to increase 
capacity and ease 
congestion. 
Los Angeles 
implemented local 
programs (e.g., Red 
Flag Parking 
Program) to increase 
road capacity. 
Closure of a major 
freeway (Highway 
101) increased 
evacuation 
congestion. 
Wong, Broader, Shaheen  32 
 
DOI: 10.7922/G29G5K2R 
 
Sheltering 
Shelters reached 
capacity quickly due to 
the number of evacuees. 
One shelter had to be 
evacuated since it 
became part of the 
evacuation zone. 
Some shelters also 
allowed pets and large 
animals. 
Large livestock in the 
area required shelter 
and were cared for by 
animal non-profits and 
local shelters. 
Shelters lacked 
accommodations for 
people with specific 
medical requirements 
(e.g., oxygen tanks). 
A variety of shelter types 
were employed including 
hotels, ARC-sponsored 
shelters, friends’ and 
families’ homes, and 
makeshift shelters (e.g., in 
parking lots). 
Shelters were threatened 
by poor weather conditions 
and spread of illnesses. 
A local university 
implemented a 
shelter-in-place plan 
rather than 
evacuate. 
Companies (e.g., 
Verizon) offered 
resources such as 
calling centers 
through the shelters. 
FEMA employed 
its texting-based 
sheltering system 
to help people 
find shelters. 
Shelters provided 
protective gear 
such as N-95 
masks. 
Reentry 
Damage to roadways 
delayed the reentry 
process. 
Some local hospital staff 
did not evacuate and 
stayed onsite to 
maintain the building 
and prepare it for 
reentry. 
The ARC offered reentry 
services, including 
assistance with 
insurance claims. 
Destruction of the area led 
it to be classified as a 
health concern, delaying 
reentry efforts. 
ARC offered supplies 
to damaged and 
destroyed areas. 
 
The county 
provided some 
residents with 
information on 
resources for 
reentry. 
Sources 
Cal Fire, 2018h; Chapman, 
2018; Espino et al., 2018; 
KCRA, 2018; KTVU, 2018; 
Ramey, 2018; Schleuss et 
al., 2018; Schultz and 
Shulman, 2018; Serna, 
2018b; Serna and Sahagun, 
2018; Shulman, 2018; 
Arango, 2018; Cal Fire, 
2018i; Johnson et al., 2018; 
Larson, 2018; Pugh 2019; 
Robertson, 2018; Sanchez 
and Thanawala, 2018; 
Steade, 2018 
Almukhtar et al., 2018; Chico 
Enterprise-Record, 2019; 
Krieger, 2018; Krieger and 
Debolt, 2019; Newberry, 
2019; Serna, 2018; St. John 
and Wootson, 2018; St. John 
and Serna, 2018; Stead Sellers 
et al., 2018; Serna et al., 2018 
American Red Cross, 
2018; Chandler, 2018; 
County of Los Angeles, 
2018; Los Angeles Fire 
Department, 2018; 
Malibu City, 2018; 
Mejia, 2018; Mejia et 
al., 2018; Pepperdine 
University, 2018; 
Reyes-Velarde, 2018 
Cal Fire, 2018l; 
Federal Emergency 
Management 
Agency, 2018; 
Lloyd, 2018; Public 
Information Officer 
Ventura County Fire 
Department, 2018a, 
2018b; Ventura 
County Fire, 2018 
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Table 7: Key Characteristics Across Major 2019 California Wildfires 
 Saddle Ridge Fire Kincade Fire Tick Fire Getty Fire 
Cause The cause of the fire is under investigation. 
The cause of the fire is 
under investigation. 
The cause of the fire is 
under investigation. 
Strong winds broke a 
tree branch, which hit a 
power line. 
Fire Behavior 
The fire was highly 
dynamic with erratic 
behavior close to 
neighborhoods. 
The fire impacted areas 
without power due to the 
PSPS event instituted by 
PG&E. 
The fire threatened 
Interstate 5, causing 
officials to close it in both 
directions. 
Damage was 
exacerbated by weather 
conditions, and the fire 
threatened Interstate 
405. 
Communication Most people were alerted via neighbors and police.  
Lack of power made 
communication (via 
mobile phones and 
landlines) very difficult. 
Communication 
challenges were 
exacerbated by power 
outages. 
The alert system, 
incapable of handling 
multiple languages, was 
criticized for being 
inequitable. 
Evacuation 
Due to poor 
communication, residents 
had little notice to 
evacuate. 
Thick smoke and lack of 
power increased 
evacuation risks. 
Dense smoke lowered 
visibility and made 
evacuating a challenge. 
Los Angeles 
implemented its Red 
Flag Parking Program to 
increase road capacity. 
Sheltering Shelters were quickly filled to capacity. 
Due to the large number 
of evacuees, many 
shelters and hotels were 
full in the area. 
A significant number of 
animal shelters were 
opened. 
Local recreation centers 
were used as shelters. 
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Reentry 
Los Angeles County 
provided residents with 
reentry resources (e.g., 
mental health counseling 
sessions, health referral, 
disaster assistance 
programs). 
Evacuees had to show 
proof of residency to 
return. 
The fire was contained 
relatively quickly, allowing 
people to return. 
Some residents and 
employees were 
allowed to reenter 
evacuation zones early.  
Sources 
CBS Staff, 2019; Cosgrove, 
2019c; Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, 2019a; 
Kenne and Bogel-Burroughs, 
2019; Miller et al., 2019; 
Platcha, 2019; Rosenberg, 
2019; Salahieh and Lyster, 
2019; Shalby, 2019 
Alexander and Cassidy, 2019; 
Asimov, 2019; Ghisolfi, 2019; 
Schmitt, 2019; Stanglin, 2019 
 
American Red Cross, 2019; 
Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, 2019b; 
Fortin-Caldera, 2019; Gerber 
and Rainey, 2019; Jennings, 
2019; LAist Staff, 2019a; 
Reyes-Velarde, 2019b; 
Rosenfeld, 2019; SF 
Chronicle, 2019;  
 
Gelt, 2019; Irfan, 2019; 
LAist Staff, 2019b; Fry and 
Vives, 2019; Shapiro et al., 
2019; Shyong, 2019; 
Stewart, 2019 
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For sheltering, large livestock in certain areas received sheltering and care alongside smaller pets 
(Mendocino Complex Fire, Carr Fire). We also found that shelters for the majority of wildfires allowed 
pets. Shelter conditions were particularly bad for the Camp Fire, as multiple tent shelters had to be 
constructed. Poor weather conditions and minimal hygiene resources led to the rapid spread of illness 
(norovirus). Another unique sheltering event was the shelter-in-place plan implemented by Pepperdine 
University (Woolsey Fire). Regarding reentry, we were unable to find specific details about the process for 
each wildfire. We do note, however, that sharing economy companies (in particular Airbnb, Lyft, and 
Uber) were highly active in the recovery and relief from several fires. Recent research (Wong and Shaheen, 
2019a; Wong and Shaheen, 2019b; Wong et al., 2020b) found companies active in the: 2017 October 
Northern California Wildfires (Airbnb, Lyft, Uber); 2017  December Southern California Wildfires (Airbnb, 
Lyft, Uber); Mendocino Complex Fire (Airbnb); Carr Fire (Airbnb, Lyft); Camp Fire (Airbnb, Lyft); and 
Woolsey and Hill Fires (Airbnb, Lyft, Uber). In addition, sharing economy companies were active in 2019 
California wildfires as seen in Table 8. 
Table 8: Sharing Economy Company Actions in Major 2019 California Wildfires 
 Saddle Ridge Fire Kincade Fire Tick Fire Getty Fire 
Actions by 
Airbnb 
Activated “Open 
Homes Program” 
(Airbnb, 2019a) 
Activated “Open 
Homes Program” 
(Airbnb, 2019b) 
Activated “Open 
Homes Program” 
(Airbnb, 2019c) 
Activated “Open 
Homes Program” 
(Airbnb, 2019c) 
Actions by Lyft 
Offered two free 
rides of up to $15 
each to local 
shelters through 
“Wheels for All 
Program” 
(Quednow, 2019) 
Offered two free 
rides of up to $15 
each to local 
shelters through 
“Wheels for All 
Program.” 
Provided the same 
ride option to 
public centers for 
the PSPS event 
across the Bay 
Area (Lyft Blog, 
2019) 
Offered two free 
rides of up to $15 
each to local 
shelters through 
“Wheels for All 
Program” (NBC 
Los Angeles, 
2019) 
Offered two free 
rides of up to $15 
each to local 
shelters through 
“Wheels for All 
Program” (NBC 
Los Angeles, 
2019) 
Actions by Uber None 
Offered two free 
rides up to $20 
each to and from 
evacuation centers 
(Garber, 2019) 
Offered two free 
rides up to $20 
each to and from 
evacuation 
centers (Garber, 
2019) 
Offered two free 
rides up to $20 
each to and from 
evacuation 
centers (Garber, 
2019) 
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California Wildfire Surveys 
Within the context established by the California wildfire case studies, we next present the California 
Wildfire surveys and corresponding results. Given the lack of available data on evacuee actions, we 
distributed an online survey to individuals impacted by: 1) the 2017 October Northern California Wildfires, 
2) the 2017 December Southern California Wildfires, and 3) the 2018 Carr Wildfire. Surveys were 
distributed with the assistance of local partners (i.e., transportation agencies, emergency management 
agencies, local city and county governments, CBOs, and news outlets). The purpose of using local partners 
was to distribute the survey as widely as possible to the general population. Partners were also used to 
avoid the cost of finding survey respondents through a survey management service. A service would likely 
have elicited few responses, since wildfires are highly localized. Partners were allowed to post the survey 
using electronic communication methods including but not limited to: Facebook, Twitter, Nextdoor, 
agency websites, news websites, email listservs, and alert subscription services. In the surveys, we asked 
respondents a range of questions related to their evacuation choices, risk perceptions, and willingness to 
share resources in evacuations. More information about results related to the feasibility of the sharing 
economy in evacuations can be found in Wong and Shaheen (2019a, 2019b). Additional analysis of the 
choices of individuals can be found in Wong et al. (2020a) using regret minimization. Table 9 presents the 
characteristics of each survey. Demographic characteristics of respondents are provided in Tables A1 and 
A2 in the Appendix. In the next sections, we present descriptive statistics from the surveys on key 
evacuation choices, communication methods, non-evacuee opinions, and government response. Table 10 
displays the primary decisions across the three wildfire cases. We note that for all descriptive statistics, 
percentages may not add to 100% due to rounding. We also note two limitations of this research. First, 
the surveys contain self-selection bias (i.e., respondents opted into the survey). Second, not all 
respondents’ demographic characteristics are representative of the population impacted by the wildfires. 
Table 9: California Wildfire Surveys 
 2017 Northern California Wildfires 
2017 Southern California 
Wildfires 2018 Carr Wildfire 
Survey Timeline March to April 2018 March to July 2018 March to April 2019 
Targeted Counties Sonoma, Napa, Solano 
Ventura, Santa Barbara, 
Los Angeles Shasta, Trinity 
Targeted Fires Tubbs, Nuns, Atlas  Thomas, Creek, Skirball  Carr 
Incentive (Drawing) Five $200 gift cards Five $200 gift cards Ten $250 gift cards 
Responses 284 552 647 
Finished Responses 92 303 338 
Finish Rate 32% 55% 52% 
Sample Size (after 
cleaning) 79 226 284 
Distribution 
Method 
Online via transportation and emergency management agencies, CBOs, NGOs 
and local media 
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Table 10: Key Evacuation Choices of Survey Respondents 
  
2017 Northern 
California 
Wildfires 
2017 Southern 
California 
Wildfires 
2018 
Carr 
Wildfire 
Sample Size (All Respondents) n=79 n=226 n=284 
Evacuation Choice      
Evacuated 46.8% 77.4% 89.4% 
Did Not Evacuate 53.2% 22.6% 10.6% 
    
Sample Size (Evacuees Only) n=37 n=175 n=254 
Departure Timing by Hour       
12:00 AM - 5:59 AM 48.6% 23.4% 9.1% 
6:00 AM - 11:59 AM 27.0% 24.6% 7.9% 
12:00 PM - 5:59 PM 10.8% 24.6% 19.7% 
6:00 PM - 11:59 PM 13.5% 27.4% 63.4% 
       
Shelter Type       
Friend's residence 24.3% 30.3% 39.8% 
Family member's residence 24.3% 32.6% 29.9% 
Hotel or motel 21.6% 22.9% 13.4% 
Public shelter 5.4% 3.4% 2.4% 
Second residence 0.0% 2.9% 3.1% 
Portable vehicle (e.g., camper, recreational 
vehicle [RV]) 8.1% 4.0% 5.1% 
Peer-to-peer service (e.g., Airbnb) 2.7% 1.1% 0.4% 
Other 13.5% 2.9% 5.9% 
       
Primary Route by Road Type       
Highways 32.4% 62.3% 38.2% 
Major roads 27.0% 15.4% 16.9% 
Local roads 2.7% 4.0% 4.7% 
Rural roads 10.8% 1.1% 4.7% 
No majority type 27.0% 17.1% 35.4% 
       
Usage of GPS for Routing       
Yes, and followed route 18.9% 18.3% 7.5% 
Yes, but rarely followed route 2.7% 4.6% 5.5% 
No 78.4% 77.1% 87.0% 
       
Multiple Destinations       
Yes 45.9% 41.7% 48.4% 
No 54.1% 58.3% 51.6% 
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Returned Home       
Yes 91.9% 92.6% 96.9% 
No 8.1% 7.4% 3.1% 
       
Within County Evacuation       
Yes 70.3% 66.3% 66.1% 
No 29.7% 33.7% 33.9% 
    
Mode Choice*       
One personal vehicle 40.5% 45.1% 33.9% 
Two personal vehicles 43.2% 40.6% 45.3% 
More than two personal vehicles 13.5% 8.6% 16.5% 
Aircraft 0.0% 0.6% 0.0% 
Rental car 2.7% 0.6% 0.0% 
RV 0.0% 1.1% 2.4% 
Truck and trailer 0.0% 2.3% 0.0% 
Non-household carpool 0.0% 1.1% 1.2% 
Carsharing (e.g., Zipcar, Enterprise 
CarShare, GIG Car Share) 0.0% 0.0% 0.4% 
Walk 0.0% 0.0% 0.4% 
    
*Other transportation mode options asked in the survey but received no responses: bus; rail 
(e.g., light/heavy, subway/metro, trolley; shuttle service; motorcycle/scooter; bicycle; 
ridesourcing/TNC (e.g., Uber, Lyft) 
Evacuate or Stay 
In the 2017 Southern California Wildfires and the 2018 Carr Wildfire, a significant number of respondents 
evacuated from the wildfire at 77.4% and 89.4% respectively. These values are somewhat dependent on 
the sampling, which makes it difficult to extrapolate numbers out to the general population. However, to 
gain more specific insight, we ran a simple bivariate cross tabulation with evacuation decision and 
mandatory order (Table 11). Two numbers are most important: 1) the non-compliance rate (i.e., 
respondents who stated they received a mandatory evacuation order but did not evacuate) and 2) the 
shadow evacuation rate (i.e., respondents who stated they did not receive a mandatory evacuation order 
but still evacuated). We found the non-compliance rate to range from 3.2% to 13.0% across the three 
fires. These low non-compliance rates indicate that individuals were highly motivated to evacuate and 
heeded evacuation orders. In some of these cases, the environmental cues of the fire coupled with the 
order may have influenced individuals to leave.  
We also calculated the shadow evacuation rate, which is typically used for analyzing hurricane 
evacuations. For hurricanes, officials issue evacuation orders before landfall with clear geographical 
boundaries based on storm risk. However, some individuals decide to leave despite not being issued a 
mandatory evacuation order. While some vulnerable individuals should probably still evacuate, most 
citizens in non-mandatory zones are safe to ride out the storm. Higher shadow evacuation rates lead to 
more congestion on the roadways, dilute emergency and transportation resources, and decrease 
sheltering availability. For wildfires, the direct implications of high and variable shadow evacuation rates 
(ranging from 29.1% to 75.0% for the three fires) are unclear. One possible explanation is that officials 
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were often unable to issue mandatory evacuation orders before residents needed to evacuate. Another 
explanation is that residents may have found the environmental cues of the fire to be very high risk, 
leading them to evacuate without an order. Future research is needed to separate the impacts of poor 
messaging and environmental cues on shadow evacuations for wildfires. 
Table 11: Bivariate Cross Tabulations for Evacuation Decision and Mandatory Order 
2017 Northern California Wildfires 
(n=79) 
Evacuation Decision 
Yes No 
Received Mandatory 
Evacuation Order 
Yes 87.5% 12.5% 
No 29.1% 70.9% 
 Total 46.8% 53.2% 
 
2017 Southern California Wildfires 
(n=226) 
Evacuation Decision 
Yes No 
Received Mandatory 
Evacuation Order 
Yes 87.0% 13.0% 
No 62.5% 37.5% 
 Total 77.4% 22.6% 
    
2018 Carr Wildfire 
(n=284) 
Evacuation Decision 
Yes No 
Received Mandatory 
Evacuation Order 
Yes 96.8% 3.2% 
No 75.0% 25.0% 
 Total 89.4% 10.6% 
 
Messaging and Communication 
We asked respondents a number of questions related to evacuation orders as seen in Table 12. We first 
found that a high proportion of the respondents from the 2017 Southern California Wildfires and 2018 
Carr Wildfire received a mandatory evacuation order. A high proportion from the 2017 Southern California 
Wildfires also received a voluntary evacuation order (note that multiple selection was allowed). For the 
message media type, most respondents across the three fires said they received mandatory orders 
through text message, personal interaction with public officials, or a secondary source (i.e., neighbor, 
friend, extended family). Reverse 911 was a popular source for the 2017 Southern California Wildfires and 
the 2018 Carr Wildfire, while social media and internet websites saw higher rates for the 2017 Southern 
California Wildfires. Respondents also received mandatory evacuation orders through alert subscription 
services heavily for the 2017 Northern and Southern California Wildfires. For voluntary evacuation orders, 
respondents tended to receive the order through text message, television, social media, internet 
websites, and secondary sources.  
A significant number of respondents from each wildfire also sought additional information for mandatory 
evacuation orders (ranging from 29.8% to 50.0%) and voluntary evacuation orders (ranging from 62.2% 
to 66.7%). This indicates that information across sources needs to be consistent. Clarity of messaging 
(extremely clear) was also fairly high across wildfires but lowest for the 2017 Southern California Wildfires. 
Voluntary evacuation orders were always less clear than mandatory evacuation orders. Level of trust of 
the source (very high) also followed a similar pattern in that trust was greater for those who received a 
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mandatory evacuation order. In addition, the level of trust of the sources (very high) was strong across 
disasters. For reentry information, only a subset of respondents received information through an official 
source (22.0% to 33.3%). This number jumps for news sources (35.3% to 64.6%), indicating that the 
dissemination of reentry plans may be best through the news. Some individuals did not receive any 
information before returning (8.5% to 23.5%), which suggests key gaps in the communication of reentry 
plans. 
 
Table 12: Communication and Messaging of Evacuation Orders 
 
2017 Northern 
California Wildfires 
2017 Southern California 
Wildfires 2018 Carr Wildfire 
Sample Size (all respondents) n=79 n=226 n=284 
Received by Order Type Mandatory Voluntary Mandatory Voluntary Mandatory Voluntary 
Received the order 30.4% 34.2% 61.1% 54.4% 66.2% 26.1% 
Did not receive the order 69.6% 65.8% 38.9% 45.6% 33.8% 73.9% 
       
Sample Size (received order) n=24 n=27 n=138 n=123 n=188 n=74 
Messaging by Order Type       
    
Message Mandatory Voluntary Mandatory Voluntary Mandatory Voluntary 
Reverse 911 call 8.3% 0.0% 34.1% 22.8% 38.8% 18.9% 
Text message 29.2% 33.3% 50.0% 52.0% 37.2% 29.7% 
Television announcement 12.5% 14.8% 21.0% 26.8% 19.7% 33.8% 
Radio announcement 4.2% 3.7% 6.5% 9.8% 6.9% 8.1% 
Flyer 0.0% 0.0% 0.7% 0.8% 0.5% 0.0% 
Personal interaction with a 
public official 41.7% 22.2% 32.6% 8.9% 30.3% 16.2% 
Social media (Facebook, 
Instagram, Twitter, etc.) 16.7% 37.0% 34.1% 35.0% 14.9% 25.7% 
Alert from a subscribed 
service 41.7% 55.6% 32.6% 35.0% 11.7% 6.8% 
Internet website (news, 
emergency 
management/government 
page) 
8.3% 29.6% 37.7% 38.2% 13.3% 21.6% 
Smartphone application 0.0% 11.1% 8.7% 14.6% 11.7% 8.1% 
Someone told you (neighbor, 
friend, extended family) 37.5% 51.9% 26.8% 22.8% 36.2% 33.8% 
Billboard or road message 
board 0.0% 0.0% 0.7% 2.4% 0.0% 0.0% 
Other 12.5% 14.8% 15.2% 7.3% 10.1% 6.8% 
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Sought Additional 
Information       
    
Answer Mandatory Voluntary Mandatory Voluntary Mandatory Voluntary 
Yes 41.7% 66.7% 50.0% 62.6% 29.8% 62.2% 
No 58.3% 29.6% 49.3% 35.0% 69.7% 37.8% 
No answer 0.0% 3.7% 0.7% 2.4% 0.5% 0.0% 
       
    
Clarity of Messaging           
Level Mandatory Voluntary Mandatory Voluntary Mandatory Voluntary 
Extremely clear 79.2% 37.0% 58.7% 44.7% 70.7% 41.9% 
Somewhat clear 12.5% 40.7% 26.8% 36.6% 16.0% 31.1% 
Neither clear nor unclear 0.0% 7.4% 2.9% 4.9% 4.8% 9.5% 
Somewhat unclear 8.3% 7.4% 9.4% 9.8% 4.3% 6.8% 
Extremely unclear 0.0% 3.7% 1.4% 1.6% 4.3% 10.8% 
No answer 0.0% 3.7% 0.7% 2.4% 0.0% 0.0% 
       
    
Trust of Source(s)           
Level Mandatory Voluntary Mandatory Voluntary Mandatory Voluntary 
Very high 87.5% 70.4% 77.5% 63.4% 83.5% 50.0% 
Somewhat high 12.5% 22.2% 18.1% 26.0% 10.1% 28.4% 
Neither high nor low 0.0% 3.7% 0.7% 6.5% 4.3% 16.2% 
Somewhat low 0.0% 0.0% 2.2% 1.6% 1.1% 5.4% 
Very low 0.0% 0.0% 0.7% 0.0% 0.5% 0.0% 
No answer 0.0% 3.7% 0.7% 2.4% 0.5% 0.0% 
       
Sample Size (returnees) n=34 n=162   n=246 
Received Information to 
Return       
    
Official source 26.5% 33.3% 22.0% 
News source 35.3% 48.8% 64.6% 
Secondary source 35.3% 28.4% 31.3% 
Did not receive information 23.5% 19.8% 8.5% 
 
Departure Day 
Departure day for wildfire evacuations is highly dependent on the characteristics of the wildfire. Unlike 
hurricanes that generally have a set landfall date, wildfires spread at different rates, making the choice of 
departure date more difficult to analyze. Indeed, it is difficult to classify evacuees as “late” or “early” 
evacuees in a wildfire context without knowing the precise impact of the fire on a residence. However, 
we still provide the statistics on departure day for all three wildfires in Table 13, since this information 
indicates days of peak congestion on roadways. We find that peak congestion for the 2017 Northern 
California Wildfires occurred on Sunday, October 8 and Monday, October 9, which falls in line with the 
timeline in our case study. Yet, some people also evacuated on October 10, as the wildfire still threatened 
areas and smoke became a major health issue. The evacuations for the 2017 Southern California Wildfires 
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were more variable. While the Creek Fire moved rapidly leading to earlier evacuations, the Thomas Fire 
was more prolonged (after rapid spreading at the start), allowing officials time to issue evacuation orders 
more methodically. For the 2018 Carr Wildfire, a significant number of people (78.3%) left on Thursday, 
July 26 when the fire threatened the city of Redding. With such high evacuation rates on a single day, 
officials need to be prepared for spikes in congestion on roadways. Some wildfires move too quickly to 
plan transportation response. However, given that some wildfires do not threaten major population 
centers until later (such as for the Carr Wildfire), proactive evacuation messaging and transportation 
response may be necessary to reduce peak congestion.   
Table 13: Departure Day of Survey Respondents 
2017 Northern California 
Wildfires 
2017 Southern California 
Wildfires 2018 Carr Wildfire 
Sunday, Oct. 8 21.6% Monday, Dec. 4 32.6% Monday, July 23 2.4% 
Monday, Oct. 9 64.9% Tuesday, Dec. 5 28.6% Tuesday, July 24 2.0% 
Tuesday, Oct. 10 8.1% Wednesday, Dec. 6 5.1% Wednesday, July 25 8.3% 
Wednesday, Oct. 11 0.0% Thursday, Dec. 7 4.0% Thursday, July 26 78.3% 
Thursday, Oct. 12 2.7% Friday, Dec. 8 4.6% Friday, July 27 5.9% 
Friday, Oct. 13 0.0% Saturday, Dec. 9 3.4% Saturday, July 28 0.8% 
Saturday, Oct. 14 2.7% Sunday, Dec. 10 8.0% Sunday, July 29 0.0% 
After Saturday, Oct. 14 0.0% After Sunday, Dec. 10 13.7% After Sunday, July 29 2.4% 
 
Departure Time of Day 
Similar to departure day, departure time of day is highly dependent on the wildfire (Table 10). For 
example, some wildfires spark at night and are fueled by stronger nighttime winds. We find that departure 
time of day was concentrated in the early morning (12:00 a.m. to 5:59 a.m.) for the 2017 Northern 
California Wildfires, which is consistent with the fire timeline. Time of day was more spread out for the 
2017 Southern California Wildfires. The highest concentration of evacuees for the 2018 Carr Wildfire was 
during the evening (6:00 p.m. to 11:59 p.m.). This is also a logical finding with the fire timeline, as the fire 
reached the Redding city limits in the afternoon of July 26. While these results are unsurprising, they do 
confirm that the evacuees from the survey followed behavioral patterns consistent with the wildfire 
events. In addition, the results indicate that agencies need to be prepared for evacuations at any hour of 
the day. 
Transportation Mode 
For transportation mode, we found that most respondents used a personal vehicle or two personal 
vehicles to evacuate (Table 10). A high number of individuals also used three or more personal vehicles to 
evacuate (ranging from 8.6% to 16.5%). These values may be due to larger households. Other evacuees 
may have wanted to protect their vehicles from the fire, packed their vehicles with additional possessions, 
or wanted additional flexibility in traveling while away from home. Despite these benefits for evacuees, 
low occupancy levels in evacuating vehicles pose a significant issue: roadways are not being utilized 
efficiently. The resulting congestion increases travel times for all evacuees, raising risk levels from the 
wildfire and decreasing the ease of evacuating. At the same time, these evacuating vehicles do have spare 
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capacity. We found that between 54.1% and 68.5% of evacuating households had at least two or more 
spare seats available over all their evacuating vehicles (i.e., seats not taken by people, luggage, or pets). 
This spare capacity could be used to help evacuate carless individuals or others with mobility challenges.  
Route 
In the survey, respondents were asked what primary route they took from five options: highways, major 
roads, local roads, rural roads, and no majority type. A primary route is defined as the road type that a 
respondent took more than 50% of the time. Respondents generally favored routing on highways for their 
primary route (Table 10). However, respondents also decided to use major roads and a mixture of roads 
(no majority type) for the 2017 Northern California Wildfires and the 2018 Carr Wildfire. While this is 
partially influenced by only one major highway running through both wildfire impact areas, some 
evacuees may have been more comfortable driving on other roads or had better knowledge of non-
highway routes. Between just 7.5% and 18.9% of respondents used GPS during the evacuation and 
followed the GPS route, even though 78.2% or more had GPS navigation available to them. Unlike 
hurricanes, where GPS is used substantially (Wong et al., 2018a), wildfires appear to require less GPS use. 
One possible explanation is that wildfire evacuations tend to be shorter and more localized. Since 
evacuees do not need to travel distances, they may have a greater knowledge of road and route options. 
Regardless, the rise of GPS navigation tools inside the vehicle and on smartphone applications (e.g., 
Google Maps, Apple Maps, Waze) could allow some evacuees to route around evacuation traffic. One 
potential side effect is that without proper knowledge of the hazard, these GPS tools could send evacuees 
toward the fire. 
Sheltering 
Most respondents stayed with friends or family for the wildfires as seen in Table 10. This result indicates 
a preference towards free housing with amenities and social connections. Some respondents also stayed 
at hotels (13.4% to 22.9%), while only a few (2.4% to 5.4%) stayed at public shelters. Even though public 
shelter use was relatively low, shelters are often used as a last resort for evacuees without family or 
friends in the area and for those who cannot pay for an extended hotel stay. Two interesting results were 
that between 4.0% and 8.1% used a portable vehicle such as an RV or camper, and between 0.4% and 
2.7% used a peer-to-peer service such as Airbnb. The portable vehicle sheltering option indicates that 
evacuees may need safe locations with enough amenities to park their vehicles. Access to power and 
dumping stations would also be beneficial. Peer-to-peer services are a new phenomenon that could offer 
alternative sheltering (and transportation) resources for evacuees (Wong et al., 2018b). These options – 
whether through the free Airbnb Open Homes Program (which encourages hosts to provide their home 
for free to evacuees) or as a standard rental – could grow with increasing service coverage. Finally, from 
41.7% to 48.4% of evacuees had to shelter in more than one location. This indicates that evacuees had 
additional transportation and housing challenges, which made the evacuation process more difficult. 
While it may be necessary to keep evacuees from returning home for safety reasons, agencies should 
consider building reentry plans to allow evacuees to return more quickly. 
Destination 
Unlike hurricanes, in which the size of the storm requires evacuees to travel long distances, wildfires often 
have localized impacts. As shown in Table 10, between 66.1% and 70.3% of evacuees stayed within their 
county of residence. These short-distance evacuations likely helped alleviate congestion, especially for 
those who had to travel further away to find shelter. As seen in Table 14, most respondents evacuated to 
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a nearby county if they decided to leave the county of their residence. Some respondents traveled long 
distances to Sacramento County for the 2018 Carr Wildfire. This is most likely because Sacramento is the 
closest large metropolitan area to Redding. We also note that the 2017 Southern California Wildfires 
included several fires separated by over 50 miles, leading to the wide geographic distribution of counties. 
Consequently, we also provide the county of destination for the Thomas and Creek Fires in Table 15. While 
the sample size is small for the Creek Fire, all respondents remained in Los Angeles County. With short-
distance evacuations across wildfires, impacted communities must be prepared for highly localized 
transportation and sheltering needs. 
Table 14: Destination by County of Survey Respondents 
2017 Northern California 
Wildfires 
2017 Southern California 
Wildfires 2018 Carr Wildfire 
n=37 n=175 n=254 
Napa 35.1% Ventura 37.1% Shasta 66.5% 
Sonoma 35.1% Santa Barbara 25.7% Tehama 5.9% 
Marin 8.1% Los Angeles 18.9% Sacramento 4.7% 
All counties under 3 
respondents each 21.6% 
San Luis Obispo 5.7% Siskiyou 3.1% 
Monterey 2.9% Butte 2.8% 
  
All counties under 5 
respondents each 9.7% 
All counties under 5 
respondents each 16.9% 
  
Table 15: Destination by County for Two 2017 Southern California Wildfires* 
Destination County Thomas Fire (Ventura and Santa Barbara Counties) 
Creek Fire (Los Angeles 
County) 
Sample Size (Evacuees) n=152 n=21 
Ventura 42.8% 0.0% 
Santa Barbara 29.6% 0.0% 
Los Angeles 7.2% 100.0% 
San Luis Obispo 6.6% 0.0% 
Monterey 3.3% 0.0% 
All counties under 5 respondents each 10.5% 0.0% 
* Two evacuees from the Skirball Fire are not included in this table 
 
Reentry Date 
Reentry date is highly dependent on the wildfire event. Long-lasting fires lead to both additional 
evacuations and later reentry dates. As seen in Figures 1 through 3, some respondents across all wildfires 
began returning to their residence quickly, most likely because the residence was no longer under threat. 
We find steady return rates for the 2017 Southern California Wildfires and the 2018 Carr Wildfire, with a 
maximum peak of 11.7% and 12.2% respectively on a single date. These results indicate that congestion 
related to reentry may not be a key concern for transportation response. We found that it took some 
respondents a considerable amount of time to return from the 2017 Southern California Wildfires as seen 
in Figure 2 with the jump for reentry after December 17. This may be a result of three factors: 1) the long-
burning Thomas Fire; 2) additional evacuation orders for mudslides immediately following the Thomas 
Fire; and/or 3) a slow process for allowing residents to return home. 
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Figure 1: Reentry Date for the 2017 Northern California Wildfires 
 
 
Figure 2: Reentry Date for the 2017 Southern California Wildfires 
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Figure 3: Reentry Date for the 2018 Carr Wildfire 
 
 
Other Evacuation Characteristics 
We also analyzed several other key evacuation characteristics that could assist practitioners in improving 
evacuation planning.  
Length of Evacuation 
Figure 4 displays the length of evacuation by each wildfire. The length of evacuation is the time between 
an evacuee leaving their residence and arriving at their final destination. We find that the majority of 
respondents took under two hours to evacuate. However, we also note that an evacuation taking even a 
few minutes longer could have dire consequences in fast-moving wildfires. Given evacuees have limited 
time to evacuate, improving traffic flow to decrease the length of evacuations is critical. At the same time, 
we also found some individuals spent 10 hours or more evacuating, which may result from long-distance 
evacuations and high levels of congestion.  
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Figure 4: Length of Evacuation by Wildfire 
 
Length of Stay and Workdays Missed 
We find in Figures 5 and 6 that while many people stayed at their final destination between one and eight 
days, a high proportion of respondents reported that they did not miss any days of work. Still, we find that 
a considerable number of people had to miss multiple days of work, which can be detrimental for 
households. This is especially problematic for individuals who hold hourly positions and do not receive 
vacation or paid-time-off benefits. By missing even a few days of work, some households living paycheck 
to paycheck would be unable to pay bills. At the same time, long stays away from home can also be costly, 
especially if respondents stay at a hotel or motel. Other resources, such as food and water, may also cost 
substantially more when respondents are away. These are important considerations for agencies, 
especially during the recovery process. Moreover, concerns about work requirements or workdays missed 
often decrease the likelihood of evacuating. Indeed, 23.5% of non-evacuees from the 2017 Southern 
California Wildfires stated that work requirements were a reason they decided not to evacuate (Table 20). 
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Figure 5: Length of Stay at Final Evacuation Destination 
 
Figure 6: Number of Missed Workdays 
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Number of Trips Before Evacuating 
Before evacuating, some households make additional trips to collect household members or find supplies. 
This trip-making prior to evacuating is sometimes necessary and must be factored into the transportation 
response. Indeed, not all vehicles on the roadway may be evacuating. The majority of survey respondents 
took either no trips or one trip before evacuating as seen in Table 16. However, some respondents 
reported that they made multiple trips before evacuating, which could severely impact other vehicles 
attempting to evacuate. While we do not know the purposes of the additional trips, we note here that 
increasing trip chaining (making multiple stops along a single trip from the point of origin to the 
destination) could decrease the number of overall trips and decrease congestion.  
Table 16: Number of Trips before Evacuation 
Number of Trips 
before Evacuation 
2017 Northern 
California Wildfires 
2017 Southern California 
Wildfires 
2018 Carr 
Wildfire 
Sample Size n=37 n=175 n=254 
0 40.5% 20.0% 25.6% 
1 24.3% 45.1% 48.0% 
2 16.2% 15.4% 12.2% 
3 5.4% 6.9% 7.9% 
4 5.4% 4.0% 2.0% 
5 or more 8.1% 8.6% 4.3% 
 
Towing Items 
Some evacuees tow additional items while they evacuate, including boats and trailers. In other cases, 
some evacuees drive a recreational vehicle and tow their personal vehicle. Since these towing 
arrangements take up additional space on roadways, they may impact calculations for traffic congestion 
and lead to less vehicle throughput during evacuations. In Table 17, we find that a high number of 
respondents for the 2018 Carr Wildfire (20.5%) towed a large item during the evacuation. Agencies should 
consider methods to decrease the number of towed items or encourage these vehicles to evacuate earlier, 
if possible. 
Table 17: Towed Large Item During Evacuation 
Towed Large Item 
During Evacuation 
2017 Northern 
California Wildfires 
2017 Southern California 
Wildfires 
2018 Carr 
Wildfire 
Sample Size n=37 n=175 n=254 
Yes 10.8% 6.3% 20.5% 
No 89.2% 93.1% 79.5% 
No answer 0.0% 0.6% 0.0% 
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Worries and Likelihood Belief of Events 
We asked respondents several questions related to their worries that events would occur on a Likert scale 
from extremely worried to not at all worried. These questions encouraged respondents to think back to 
the time before they decided to evacuate or not from the wildfires. We asked a similar set of questions 
regarding respondents’ belief that an event would occur on a Likert scale from extremely likely to 
extremely unlikely. In Tables 18 and 19, we present only the percentage of respondents who were 
extremely worried or believed that an event would be extremely likely to occur.  
We find that respondents were extremely worried about the severity of the wildfire and the speed of the 
wildfire. We also find that about a quarter of respondents across wildfires were extremely worried about 
traffic. A sizable number of respondents were also extremely worried about finding resources such as 
housing, gasoline, and food, indicating the perception of resource shortages. Other respondents were 
extremely worried about the cost of transportation and the cost of housing (to a stronger degree), which 
suggests that some respondents did not have the means to pay for an evacuation. For likelihood belief, 
many respondents believed that it would be extremely likely that their residence would lose utilities (i.e., 
power and water), burn down, and/or have structural damage. Looting concerns were especially high for 
the 2018 Carr Wildfire, while concerns over a lack of first responders were especially high for the 2017 
Northern California Wildfires. A significant number of respondents also believed that they would be 
extremely likely to have work requirements, which might encourage citizens to stay at home or try to 
return early.  
Table 18: Worry About Certain Events Before Evacuating (Extremely Worried) 
 
2017 Northern 
California 
Wildfires 
2017 Southern 
California 
Wildfires 
2018 Carr 
Wildfire 
Sample Size n=79 n=226 n=284 
Severity of the Wildfires 55.7% 59.3% 51.1% 
Speed of Wildfires 63.3% 66.4% 57.0% 
Evacuation Process 30.4% 44.2% 25.0% 
Traffic 21.5% 25.7% 26.4% 
Finding Housing 10.1% 15.5% 11.6% 
Finding Gasoline 11.4% 11.5% 9.5% 
Finding Food 7.6% 9.7% 4.6% 
Cost of Transportation 1.3% 7.1% 4.6% 
Cost of Housing 8.9% 15.9% 7.0% 
 
Table 19: Belief of the Probability About Certain Events Before Evacuating (Extremely 
Likely) 
 
2017 Northern 
California 
Wildfires 
2017 Southern 
California 
Wildfires 
2018 Carr 
Wildfire 
Sample Size n=79 n=226 n=284 
Residence Burns Down 26.6% 31.0% 32.0% 
Injury/Death 5.1% 10.2% 9.2% 
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Utility Loss 41.8% 58.8% 57.0% 
Structural Damage 29.1% 34.1% 35.2% 
Belongings Damaged 30.4% 38.5% 36.6% 
Belongings Stolen 10.1% 11.9% 23.9% 
First Responders Not Available 29.1% 16.4% 16.5% 
Require Rescuing 6.3% 10.2% 5.6% 
Work Requirement 22.8% 18.1% 18.7% 
 
Non-Evacuees 
While the focus of this research is to understand the decisions of evacuees, we also asked non-evacuees 
about the reasons they did not evacuate. The primary reasons for not evacuating included not receiving 
any evacuation orders, not wanting to leave, and wanting to protect property (Table 20). Traffic 
congestion also played a role in non-evacuee decision-making. Some individuals decided not to evacuate 
because they did not want to sit in traffic (4.8% to 7.8%). Improving transportation response to decrease 
congestion can serve a dual role: 1) improving the evacuation for individuals already evacuating and 2) 
encouraging at-risk non-evacuees to also evacuate. We also note that some people may not have the 
ability or the resources to evacuate. We find this to be the case in our surveys, with between 3.3% and 
5.9% of respondents indicating they did not have the money to evacuate. Other respondents did not have 
the opportunity to shelter with friends or family, while others did not have transportation to get to a safe 
location. 
Table 20: Reasons to Not Evacuate for Non-Evacuees 
Reasons to Not Evacuate 
Multiple selection allowed 
2017 
Northern 
California 
Wildfires 
2017 
Southern 
California 
Wildfires 
2018 Carr 
Wildfire 
Sample Size (non-evacuees) n=42 n=51 n=30 
Did not receive any orders 71.4% 47.1% 30.0% 
Did not want to leave 31.0% 39.2% 26.7% 
Wanted to protect property 16.7% 29.4% 36.7% 
Some requirement to go to work during wildfire 9.5% 23.5% 0.0% 
Was not sure where pets could be taken 7.1% 7.8% 10.0% 
Believed the wildfires would not be bad 4.8% 21.6% 0.0% 
Did not want to sit in traffic 4.8% 7.8% 6.7% 
Did not have the money to evacuate 4.8% 5.9% 3.3% 
Did not want to go to public shelter 2.4% 15.7% 0.0% 
No transportation to get to shelter 2.4% 2.0% 0.0% 
No friends or family to shelter with 0.0% 9.8% 3.3% 
Tried to but ended up going back home due to traffic 0.0% 2.0% 3.3% 
Tried to but was turned away at shelter 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
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Government Response 
Finally, we asked respondents their opinion of the effectiveness of government response in five main 
areas: communication, road management, evacuating carless populations, shelter management, and 
overall evacuation management. We did not specify the type of agency. Across wildfires in Figures 7 
through 9, respondents did not find most government response to be extremely effective or very 
effective. The highest performing areas across the wildfires were shelter management and overall 
evacuation management. Respondents found the government response of evacuating carless populations 
to be fairly poor with 21.5% to 33.5% stating that the response was not effective at all. Communication 
also received poor marks, especially for the 2017 Northern California Wildfires and the 2018 Carr Wildfire. 
Road management tended to receive responses in the middle of the scale, indicating some success during 
the evacuation but also room for improvement. Takeaways and recommendations from these opinions 
and other descriptive statistic results will be highlighted in a later section. 
 
Figure 7: Opinion of Government Effectiveness – 2017 Northern California Wildfires 
(n=79) 
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Figure 8: Opinion of Government Effectiveness – 2017 Southern California Wildfires 
(n=226) 
 
Figure 9: Opinion of Government Effectiveness – 2018 Carr Wildfire (n=284) 
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Recommendations 
To consolidate results and provide practice-ready strategies for practitioners, we present several 
recommendations for wildfire evacuations. Additional recommendations for wildfire logistics 
management and building a shared resource evacuation strategy can be found in Wong and Shaheen 
(2019a, 2019b) and Wong et al. (2020a). We use the following abbreviations in the recommendations 
section: SoCal (2017 December Southern California Wildfires) and Carr (2018 Carr Wildfire).  
Evacuation Orders and Communication 
1. Agencies should leverage mandatory evacuation orders, improve evacuation order communication, 
and rapidly distribute orders to increase compliance. Evacuation orders should contain additional 
information (e.g., available shelters, current road closures, safety tips, reminders to help others) to 
improve the evacuation. 
Evidence: Individuals impacted by both the Southern California and Carr Wildfires who received a 
mandatory evacuation order were more likely to evacuate. 
2. Evacuation orders, especially when both voluntary and mandatory orders are issued, need to have 
clear geographical boundaries and departure times to reduce shadow evacuations. Orders also need 
to be distributed rapidly. 
Evidence: 62.5% (SoCal) and 75.0% (Carr) of respondents who stated they did not receive a 
mandatory evacuation order, still decided to evacuate (i.e., shadow evacuation). 
3. All communication with the public should be quickly distributed and consistent across platforms. 
Agencies should maintain a high media presence and attempt to control rumors to improve 
communication flow. Agencies should also consider alternative low-tech communication methods 
including door-to-door notifications, radios, static sirens, and mobile sirens (via emergency vehicles 
or drones) to prepare for power outages.   
Evidence: 50.0% (SoCal) and 29.8% (Carr) of respondents who received a mandatory evacuation 
order sought additional information. Moreover, six (SoCal) and four (Carr) different platforms 
each reached at least 30% of respondents who received a mandatory order. From the case 
studies, communication systems that required power (i.e., cell towers, landlines) sometimes 
failed during the wildfires. 
4. Voluntary orders should be used sparingly in disasters, and language should be geared towards 
preparation to reduce mobilization time. However, agencies should also consider access and 
functional needs populations when issuing voluntary orders, as some of these populations may 
require additional assistance or need to depart earlier due to their vulnerability. 
Evidence: Only 44.7% (SoCal) and 41.9% (Carr) of respondents who received a voluntary 
evacuation order found the message to be extremely clear. Moreover, very high trust levels of 
the messaging source were lower for voluntary evacuation orders than for mandatory orders for 
both the SoCal (-14.1%) and Carr (-33.5%) fires. 
5. Agencies should consider alternatives to build an opt-out system (as opposed to a current opt-in 
system) for emergency alerts or develop a marketing campaign to encourage signups.  
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Evidence: For multiple wildfire case studies, agencies were unable to reach a significant number 
of residents in the jurisdictions via emergency alert systems. While the WEA system overcomes 
opt-in challenges, agencies often hesitate to use it due to geographic control issues and messaging 
limitations.  
6. To decrease defending behavior, agencies should develop information and education campaigns 
about the risks of defending and the impacts it has on firefighting ability. Agencies could consider 
workshops, public forums, and school-based programs to encourage safe behavior for wildfires. 
Evidence: 29.4% (SoCal) and 36.7% (Carr) of non-evacuees stated a reason for not evacuating was 
wanting to protect their property. Reports from several wildfire case studies indicated substantial 
defending behavior that hampered firefighters and first responders. 
7. Agencies should notify the public beforehand via preparedness plans on the intended methods of 
communication. Agencies should also pre-develop content in other languages and have translators 
available during disaster response and recovery to assist non-English speakers. 
Evidence: In some wildfire cases, residents did not know about certain communication methods 
that could have been useful sources of information regarding the evacuation and wildfire. 
Moreover, content in other languages was communicated long after English content or not even 
created.  
Departure Timing 
8. Agencies should develop a phased evacuation plan that subdivides high-risk areas into zones for 
different timed releases to reduce congestion. This plan should be empirically driven and clearly 
communicated to the public well in advance. Agencies may also need to distribute preparedness 
information and encourage residents to pack vehicles beforehand to more effectively control 
departure times. 
Evidence: While most California wildfires occurred rapidly, several wildfires did not require mass 
evacuations until several days after ignition. 78.3% of Carr evacuees departed three days after 
ignition. In cases when wildfires spark further away from the WUI or spread less rapidly, agencies 
need transportation plans to reduce congestion on the roadways via a phased plan. 
9. Agencies need to be prepared for evacuations that occur at any time of day, including more chaotic 
nighttime evacuations. Given the high variability of when wildfires occur, agencies need to be able to 
ramp up resources, staff, and communication very quickly at any time of day. 
Evidence: From the wildfire case studies and descriptive statistics, departure time of day was 
highly dependent on the wildfire and characteristics of the event.  
10. Agencies should be prepared for high spikes in evacuations that could occur at any point during the 
wildfire. Some response strategies might include staffing intersections quickly, rapidly changing signal 
timing, removing stalled or parked vehicles, reversing all lanes to move away from the fire, and/or 
encouraging carpooling.  
Evidence: A significant number of evacuees left on a single day (78.3% for Carr), which led to 
significant congestion according to the case study. Agencies need a toolkit of rapid deployment 
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options to handle this rapid increase in evacuees, particularly given the evolving nature of 
wildfires. 
Transportation Mode and Route 
11. Transportation response and evacuation models need to account for multi-vehicle households when 
designing capacity-increasing measures. Agencies should also consider leveraging potential spare 
capacity in extra vehicles to help carless households. 
Evidence: 40.6% (SoCal) and 45.3% (Carr) of evacuees used two vehicles for their evacuation. 
Moreover, 8.6% (SoCal) and 16.5% (Carr) of evacuees used three or more vehicles.  
12. Agencies, including state agencies, should deploy congestion reduction measures closer to the impact 
area of the fire, in high-risk neighborhoods, and along major arterial roads. In cases where highways 
are close to the impact area, resources should also be deployed to increase highway capacity.  
Evidence: 37.7% (SoCal) and 61.8% (Carr) of evacuees did not use highways as their primary route 
while evacuating. 62.3% of SoCal evacuees used highways as a primary route, which reflects high 
usage of Highway 101 for the Thomas Fire.  
13. Agencies should consider working with app-based navigation companies (e.g., Waze, Google Maps, 
Apple Maps) and in-vehicle navigation systems to restrict travel on dangerous and blocked roads. 
Evidence: Although only 18.3% (SoCal) and 7.5% (Carr) of evacuees used a GPS system and 
followed the GPS route during the wildfires, 78.2% or more of respondents had access to GPS 
navigation. 
14. Transit agencies should be ready to deploy drivers and buses to assist evacuees, particularly those in 
denser areas and health care facilities. Transit also has an added benefit of reducing congestion on 
roadways due to high occupancy.  
Evidence: From the case studies, transit vehicles were highly effective in evacuating vulnerable 
populations.  
Destination and Sheltering 
15. Transportation, sheltering, and relief resources should be concentrated within the county of impact.  
Evidence: Approximately two-thirds of evacuees (SoCal and Carr) evacuated within county, 
indicating the preference to remain close to the disaster area and travel shorter distances. 
Adjacent counties were also popular among evacuees. 
16. Agencies should increase accommodation capacity by working with the ARC, other NGOs, CBOs (e.g., 
churches), private companies (e.g., Airbnb), and private citizens. 
Evidence: Across most wildfire case studies, public shelters filled rapidly, and 15.7% of non-
evacuees (SoCal) cited not wanting to go to a public shelter as a reason to forgo evacuating. 
Moreover, 9.8% (SoCal) and 3.3% (Carr) of non-evacuees did not evacuate because they could not 
shelter with friends or family. 
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17. Agencies should ensure that public shelters have resources (e.g., ADA accessible facilities, medical 
supplies, trained staff) for access and functional needs populations and space for pets. Shelters should 
be pre-designated if pets are allowed. 
Evidence: Reports from some wildfire case studies indicated a lack of resources for access and 
functional needs populations and restrictions on pets. 7.8% (SoCal) and 10.0% (Carr) of non-
evacuees did not know where they could take their pets. 
18. Shelters should be placed outside of primary fire risk areas to avoid shelter evacuations, which cause 
additional congestion and safety issues. 
Evidence: Wildfire case studies revealed several instances in which established shelters were 
under threat of fire damage or had to be evacuated due to oncoming fire.  
Reentry 
19. Agencies should develop clear reentry plans that are communicated to the public prior to the wildfire. 
Different forms of communication (e.g., text messages, Internet, flyers) should be used to increase 
outreach. 
Evidence: Wildfire case studies found that while resources were available for recovery and 
reentry, agencies lacked formalized plans, which increased general confusion. 
20. Reentry plans need a communication element to transmit procedures for returning to evacuees. 
Similar to evacuation orders, reentry information should be communicated consistently across 
multiple platforms. 
Evidence: 8.5% (Carr) and 19.8% (SoCal) of evacuees did not receive any information on how to 
return. Just 22.0% (Carr) and 33.3% (SoCal) of evacuees received information directly from an 
official source. 
21. Agencies likely do not need special transportation response for reentry, but rather a continued 
recovery and relief effort. This effort may involve ensuring that public transit continues to operate, 
encouraging carpooling, and creating a clear reentry process.  
Evidence: Unlike evacuations, travel did not spike for reentry, with a maximum peak of 11.7% 
(SoCal) and 12.2% (Carr) returning on a single day. 
Other Evacuation Characteristics 
22. Agencies should work with employers to reduce work requirements for evacuees and increase flexible 
schedules (e.g., telecommuting) to increase evacuation rates. 
Evidence: 23.5% of SoCal non-evacuees stated that work requirements were a reason they 
decided not to evacuate. Moreover, 56.3% (Carr) and 62.9% (SoCal) of evacuees missed at least 
one day of work due to the wildfires.  
23. Agencies should consider methods to decrease the number of towed items (i.e., restricting boats) in 
order to decrease congestion. 
Wong, Broader, Shaheen  58 
 
DOI: 10.7922/G29G5K2R 
 
Evidence: 6.3% (SoCal) and 20.5% (Carr) of evacuees towed an item during the evacuation. While 
some of these items could serve as housing (i.e., an RV), other items increase congestion without 
serving a transportation or sheltering purpose. 
24. Residents should be reminded to chain trips together as much as possible prior to evacuating and 
create preparedness plans for their family that reduce overall travel. 
Evidence: 74.4% (Carr) and 80.0% (SoCal) of evacuees took at least one trip prior to evacuating, 
suggesting trips to gather supplies and family members. While these trips are sometimes 
necessary, agencies should consider options that decrease pre-evacuation trip-making, which 
could impact the evacuation of other people and increase overall congestion.  
Conclusion 
In this report, we conducted a case study analysis of 11 major wildfires in California between 2017 and 
2019 and presented results from three surveys of individuals impacted by California wildfires. The case 
studies found that approximately 1.1 million people were ordered to evacuate, 1.47 million acres were 
burned, and 30,000 structures were destroyed across the 11 major wildfires. The case studies revealed 
several strong similarities related to: human involvement in starting and spreading the fires; windy and 
dry conditions that exacerbated fire spread; varied and usually ineffective communication methods; 
considerable congestion due to personal vehicles; rapid filling of shelters; and a lack of formalized reentry 
plans. Despite these similarities, each wildfire context led to unique responses and events, which suggests 
that transportation responses need to be tailored to specific communities, densities, topologies, and 
wildfire characteristics. 
Through the survey of individuals impacted by the 2017 October Northern California Wildfires, the 2017 
December Southern California Wildfires, and the 2018 Carr Wildfire, we found a number of similarities. 
Non-compliance rates were relatively low, particularly compared to hurricanes (Wong et al., 2018a), and 
shadow evacuation rates were moderately to significantly high. About two-thirds of evacuees across the 
surveys stated they stayed within county for the evacuation. The distribution of transportation mode was 
also similar across wildfires, with strong use of personal vehicles and significant multi-vehicle evacuations. 
Accommodation type for sheltering was also consistent across wildfires, while GPS usage, pre-evacuation 
trip-making, length of evacuation, and missed workdays were fairly similar. For key differences, departure 
day, departure time of day, and reentry day were highly dependent on the wildfire characteristics, while 
route choice mirrored geography and road networks. Communication methods also varied between 
wildfires, indicating differing agency preferences. Opinion of government response across the wildfires 
was also varied. However, overall evacuation management received the highest effectiveness levels, and 
evacuation of carless populations received the lowest effectiveness levels. Differences between wildfire 
survey results indicate that community-specific transportation responses for evacuations will be 
necessary to plan and employ.  
This report suggests that a considerable amount of work is still necessary to build evacuation plans and 
effectively respond during wildfires. While agencies have continued to improve over the last three years, 
the impact of ongoing climate change, increased development in high-risk areas, new policies (e.g., public 
safety power shutoff events), and evolving risks will only magnify the need for wildfire research and 
evacuation preparedness. Future work should begin to address wide gaps in knowledge, including wildfire 
evacuation behavior, wildfire impact on vulnerable populations, wildfires in rural communities, cascading 
threats involving wildfires, and wildfire recovery processes.  
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Appendix 
Table A1: Individual and Household Characteristics of Survey Respondents 
  
2017 Northern 
California 
Wildfires 
2017 Southern 
California 
Wildfires 
2018 
Carr 
Wildfire 
Sample Size (All Respondents) n=79 n=226 n=284 
Individual Characteristics       
Gender       
Male 22.8% 26.1% 30.3% 
Female 77.2% 73.9% 69.7% 
       
Age       
18-24 2.5% 2.7% 2.8% 
25-34 15.2% 17.7% 12.7% 
35-44 12.7% 15.0% 19.0% 
45-54 21.5% 19.0% 22.9% 
55-64 26.6% 26.5% 19.7% 
65+ 21.5% 19.0% 22.9% 
       
Race       
Asian 2.5% 2.7% 1.1% 
Black or African-American 0.0% 0.4% 0.0% 
Mixed 6.3% 7.5% 3.5% 
Native American/Alaska Native 1.3% 0.4% 1.4% 
Pacific Islander 1.3% 0.9% 0.0% 
White 83.5% 81.4% 90.8% 
Other 1.3% 4.0% 0.0% 
Prefer not to answer 3.8% 2.7% 3.2% 
       
Ethnicity       
Hispanic 5.1% 11.1% 5.3% 
Not Hispanic 82.3% 76.1% 87.3% 
Prefer not to answer/No answer 12.7% 12.8% 7.4% 
       
Education       
No high school degree 0.0% 0.0% 0.7% 
High school graduate 5.1% 0.9% 4.9% 
Some college 12.7% 15.9% 23.2% 
2-year degree 7.6% 5.8% 12.0% 
4-year degree 32.9% 41.2% 27.8% 
Graduate or professional degree 29.1% 28.3% 27.5% 
Doctorate 10.1% 8.0% 3.9% 
Prefer not to answer 2.5% 0.0% 0.0% 
       
Employment       
Employed full time 49.4% 57.1% 47.9% 
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Employed part time 13.9% 11.9% 10.9% 
Unemployed looking for work 5.1% 2.2% 2.8% 
Unemployed not looking for work 5.1% 2.7% 4.2% 
Retired 21.5% 22.1% 26.1% 
Student 0.0% 2.2% 1.8% 
Disabled 2.5% 1.3% 2.8% 
Prefer not to answer 2.5% 0.4% 3.5% 
       
Primary Mode of Transportation       
Drive alone using a car, SUV, pickup, or van 81.0% 87.6% 92.6% 
Carpool/vanpool 0.0% 2.2% 1.4% 
Rail (e.g., light/heavy, subway/metro, trolley) 0.0% 0.9% 0.0% 
Bus 1.3% 1.8% 0.0% 
Motorcycle/scooter 0.0% 0.9% 0.4% 
Bicycle 1.3% 0.9% 0.7% 
Walk 3.8% 0.4% 0.0% 
Shuttle service 0.0% 0.0% 0.4% 
Work from home 7.6% 1.8% 1.4% 
Other 5.1% 0.9% 2.8% 
Prefer not to answer/No answer 0.0% 2.7% 0.4% 
       
Decision Making Role       
Sole decision maker 24.1% 25.2% 18.3% 
Primary decision maker with input from another 
household member 12.7% 19.9% 19.4% 
Share equally in making decisions with another 
household member(s) 58.2% 51.3% 57.4% 
Provide input into decisions, but not the primary 
decision maker 5.1% 2.2% 3.2% 
Another person is the sole decision maker 0.0% 0.4% 1.4% 
Prefer not to answer 0.0% 0.9% 0.4% 
       
Previous Evacuee       
Yes 20.3% 35.3% 31.0% 
No 79.7% 64.7% 69.0% 
       
Previous Wildfire Experience       
Yes 77.2% 93.4% 89.1% 
No 22.8% 6.6% 10.9% 
       
Mobile Phone Access and Type       
Do not own a mobile phone 1.3% 2.7% 3.2% 
Own a typical mobile phone (non-smartphone) 7.6% 5.3% 3.9% 
Own a smartphone 91.1% 92.0% 93.0% 
       
Access to Internet at Home       
Yes 100.0% 98.7% 97.2% 
No 0.0% 1.3% 2.8% 
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In-Vehicle or Smartphone Navigation        
Yes 87.3% 79.6% 78.2% 
No 12.7% 20.4% 21.8% 
       
Household Characteristics       
Displacement after Wildfire       
Same Residence 93.7% 88.9% 87.0% 
Displaced 6.3% 10.6% 13.0% 
No answer 0.0% 0.4% 0.0% 
       
Length of Residence       
Less than 6 months 5.8% 5.8% 3.2% 
6 to 11 months 4.9% 4.9% 5.3% 
1 to 2 years 12.4% 12.4% 13.7% 
3 to 4 years 14.6% 14.6% 9.5% 
5 to 6 years 7.1% 7.1% 7.7% 
7 to 8 years 5.3% 5.3% 5.3% 
9 to 10 years 4.9% 4.9% 6.0% 
More than 10 years 45.1% 45.1% 49.3% 
       
Residence Structure       
Site build (single home) 79.7% 73.9% 91.2% 
Site build (apartment) 12.7% 19.5% 4.2% 
Mobile/manufactured home 6.3% 6.2% 4.6% 
Prefer not to answer 1.3% 0.4% 0.0% 
       
Homeownership       
Yes 78.5% 67.3% 81.3% 
No 21.5% 29.6% 17.3% 
Prefer not to answer 0.0% 3.1% 1.4% 
       
Live in Cal Fire High Risk Area       
Yes 10.1% 38.1% 37.7% 
No 48.1% 28.8% 35.2% 
Do not know 41.8% 33.2% 27.1% 
       
Household Characteristics       
Household with Person with a Disability 19.0% 14.2% 18.7% 
Household with Children 27.8% 25.2% 35.2% 
Household with Older Adults 29.1% 28.3% 31.3% 
Households with Pets 75.9% 63.7% 81.7% 
       
Household Income       
Less than $10,000 1.3% 0.4% 0.7% 
$10,000 - $14,999 1.3% 1.3% 3.9% 
$15,000 - $24,999 1.3% 2.2% 2.8% 
$25,000 - $34,999 0.0% 2.2% 5.6% 
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$35,000 - $49,999 8.9% 6.2% 9.5% 
$50,000 - $74,999 19.0% 14.6% 17.6% 
$75,000 - $99,999 7.6% 11.5% 14.8% 
$100,000 - $149,999 21.5% 21.2% 19.7% 
$150,000 - $199,999 8.9% 13.3% 5.6% 
$200,000 or more 19.0% 14.2% 8.1% 
Prefer not to answer 11.4% 12.8% 11.6% 
 
Table A2: County of Residence of Survey Respondents 
2017 Northern California 
Wildfires 
2017 Southern California 
Wildfires 2018 Carr Wildfire 
n=79 n=226 n=284 
Sonoma 64.6% Ventura 43.8% Shasta 94.0% 
Napa 24.1% Santa Barbara 41.6% Other California 2.5% 
Solano 11.4% Los Angeles 13.3% Non-California 3.5% 
  Other California 1.3%   
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